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Article

Constitutionalizing Consumer Financial
Protection: The Case for the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau
Hosea H. Harvey†
INTRODUCTION
Since its inception, the imminent death of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB or Bureau) has been as exaggerated as the (first) death of Mark Twain.1 The Bureau,2 part
of Congress’s response to the 2008 financial crisis, is an independent executive agency responsible for consumer financial
protection.3 The CFPB attempts to “regulate[] the offering and
provision of consumer financial products [and] services,” while

† Associate Professor of Law, Temple University, Beasley School of Law.
Special thanks to the Minnesota Law Review for an excellent symposium. In
addition, appreciation is extended to the Association of American Law Schools
(AALS) Section on Commercial & Related Consumer Law and the AALS Section
on Creditors’ and Debtors’ Rights for selecting the paper for presentation at the
2019 AALS Annual Meeting. The author thanks Jane Baron, Hank Chambers,
Rick Greenstein, Aman McLeod, Lauren Ouziel, Lauren Sudeall, and Rory Van
Loo for feedback on earlier drafts. Copyright © 2019 by Hosea H. Harvey.
1. Frank Marshall White, Mark Twain Amused: Humorist Says He Even
Heard on Good Authority that He Was Dead, N.Y.J. (June 2, 1897), https://cdn
.loc.gov/service/sgp/sgpbatches/batch_dlc_delancey_ver02/data/sn83030180/
print2444/1897060201/0181.pdf. Mark Twain’s off-misquoted letter reads:
“James Ross Clemens, of St. Louis, a cousin of mine, was seriously ill two or
three weeks ago in London, but is well now. The report of my illness grew out of
his illness. The report of my death was an exaggeration.” Id.
2. Hereinafter, I refer to the Bureau under its most well-known colloquial
moniker, CFPB, rather than the Bureau’s “official legal name.” See, e.g., Kathy
Kraninger (@CFPBDirector), TWITTER (Dec. 19, 2018, 12:48 PM), https://twitter
.com/CFPBDirector/status/1075493112418570240 (exploring the Bureau’s ongoing dialogue about its legal name versus its branded name).
3. 156 CONG. REC. 9839 (2010) (statement of Rep. Holt); see also About Us,
CFPB, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us (last visited April 14, 2019).
The Bureau’s genesis is described best by Oren Bar-Gill and Elizabeth Warren.
See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
1 (2008).
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ensuring that consumers are empowered to “make better informed financial decisions.”4 The CFPB’s design-features were
needed, in part, to consolidate regulatory authority and other
functions from numerous other federal regulatory agencies.5
Furthermore, because its design-features include insulation
from congressional appropriation review and for-cause executive
removal power, the agency is largely protected from outside influence, except perhaps during the nomination process of its singular director.6 The Bureau has been the subject of many critiques—political and legal, empirical and anecdotal—about each
and every part of its operations, spanning employment decisions,7 the recess appointment power,8 the validity of a fivemember structure,9 its ability to regulate certain industries10 or

4. About Us, supra note 3.
5. Megan Slack, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 101: Why We Need
a Consumer Watchdog, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 4, 2012), https://obamawhitehouse
.achives.gov/blog/2012/01/04/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-101-why
-we-need-consumer-watchdog.
6. Congress generally controls agency budget reviews, and that relationship can be understood to give Congress substantive authority over the agency.
The CFPB operates within the Federal Reserve and is not required to submit to
congressional budget allocation review. The CFPB was also created with a provision restricting the President’s removal power over the Director to only situations where just-cause exists, limiting executive influence. 12 U.S.C.
§ 5491(c)(3) (2012) (“The President may remove the Director for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”). The Director of the CFPB serves a fiveyear term and must be nominated by the President and approved by the Senate.
Id. § 5491(b)–(c) (outlining the term and nomination process of the Director).
7. See Class Action Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, Jones v. Mulvaney, No. 18-2132 (D.D.C. Sept. 13, 2018) (commencing a class action complaint against the CFPB’s internal employment practices); see also Barbara S.
Mishkin, Director Cordray to Testify at July 30 House Hearing on Alleged CFPB
Employee Discrimination, BALLARD SPAHR (July 28, 2014), https://www
.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2014/07/28/director-cordray-to-testify-at-july-30
-house-hearing-on-alleged-cfpb-employee-discrimination.
8. See, e.g., CFPB v. Gordon, 819 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2016) (challenging
the CFPB’s enforcement power under improper recess appointments); see also
Barbara Mishkin, Director Cordray Ratifies Pre-Confirmation Actions, BALLARD SPAHR (Aug. 30, 2013), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2013/
08/30/director-cordray-ratifies-pre-confirmation-actions.
9. The Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection’s Unconstitutional Design: Hearing Before H. Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations, 155th Cong.
5–8 (2017) (statement of Adam J. White, Research Fellow, The Hoover Institute), https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/03.21.2017_adam_
white_testimony.pdf.
10. Kit Addleman & Billy Marsh, Auto Finance Companies Now Subject to
CFPB Supervisory Authority, HAYNES BOONE (July 14, 2015), http://www
.haynesboone.com/Alerts/auto-finance-companies-now-subject-to-cfpb.
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certain financial products,11 privacy considerations,12 and a host
of other concerns, such as whether its actions reduce access to
credit or financial products.13 These concerns appear motivated
by an array of ideological and legal considerations. But, perhaps
these concerns arose because the Bureau was remarkably effective at its inception and engaged in regulatory practices that
threatened entrenched bureaucratic interests and industry
stakeholders.14 It also appears to have been an effective advocate
for racial justice, promoting both credit access and anti-discrimination principles,15 something its critics may have found problematic.

11. Astra Taylor, Why It’s So Hard to Regulate Payday Lenders, NEW
YORKER (Aug. 6, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/why-its
-so-hard-to-regulate-payday-lenders.
12. James Shreve, CFPB Final Rule Cuts Costs and Headaches from Annual Privacy Notices, THOMPSON COBURN (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www
.thompsoncoburn.com/insights/blogs/cybersecurity-bits-and-bytes/post/2018-08
-21/cfpb-final-rule-cuts-costs-and-headaches-from-annual-privacy-notices.
13. Todd Zywicki, The CFPB Could Be a Force for Good, WALL ST. J. (Feb.
19, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-cfpb-could-be-a-force-for-good
-1519070012?mod=djkeyword&tesla=y; see also Todd Zywicki, The Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau: Savior or Menace?, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856,
856 (2013) (“The CFPB’s structure virtually guarantees the manifestation of
those pathologies in practice: excessive risk aversion, agency imperialism, and
tunnel vision.”). For a reflective review of these critiques and others, see Todd
J. Zywicki, The Dodd-Frank Act Five Years Later: Are We More Stable? (Geo.
Mason L. Studies Res. Paper No. LS 15-10, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract
=2651942 (utilizing author’s Congressional testimony about the status of consumer financial protection efforts).
14. See, e.g., Leonard J. Kennedy et al., The Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau: Financial Regulation for the Twenty-First Century, 97 CORNELL L. REV.
1141 (2012); see also Christopher Lewis Peterson, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Law Enforcement: An Empirical Review, 90 TUL. L. REV. 1057
(2016) (evaluating CFPB’s track record for enforcing financial protection laws);
Gretchen Morgenson, The Watchdog Protecting Consumers May Be Too Effective, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/10/business/
consumer-financial-protection-bureau-gretchen-morgenson.html (detailing debates on effectiveness and success of CFPB enforcement actions).
15. See, e.g., Press Release, CFPB, CFPB and DOJ Take Action Against
National City Bank for Discriminatory Mortgage Pricing (Dec. 23, 2013),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-and-doj-take-action
-against-national-city-bank-for-discriminatory-mortgage-pricing (announcing
CFPB’s $35 million settlement of complaint against National City Bank “for
charging higher prices on mortgage loans to African-American and Hispanic
borrowers than similarly creditworthy white borrowers between the years 2002
and 2008”); see also Press Release, CFPB, CFPB and DOJ Order Hudson City
Bank to Pay $27 Million to Increase Mortgage Credit Access in Communities
Illegally Redlined (Sept. 24, 2015), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/
newsroom/cfpb-and-doj-order-hudson-city-savings-bank-to-pay-27-million-to
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These voluminous critiques and robust defenses of the Bureau have, however, bypassed a more foundational question:
whether the CFPB’s structure and design are consistent with the
Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence. Though many recent cases have raised the constitutional question, it has been
underdeveloped in legal scholarship. Reviewing the totality of
such cases provides a framework for understanding—and ultimately rejecting—the constitutional concerns of its critics.
The CFPB’s constitutional critics argue that: (1) Article II’s
Take Care and Appointments Clauses (Sections 2 and 3) and the
Supreme Court’s prior precedents require independent commissions and agencies to have a five-member form to satisfy the Supreme Court’s prior agency jurisprudence; (2) the novelty of the
CFPB’s structure is presumptively unconstitutional absent clear
historical precedent that agencies are routinely structured this
way; (3) the accrued power in the CFPB’s director violates Article II because the President has limited removal power over the
Director; (4) the Director’s accrued powers are a grave, general
threat to personal liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution, because other branches of government cannot exercise sufficient
control over the CFPB’s actions, violating the principle of separation of powers; and more subversively, (5) independent agencies should all be found to be unconstitutional because they restrict the President’s ability to faithfully execute the laws or
violate separation of powers principles. Much of these critiques
can be collapsed into the brusque conclusion of one such critic,
then-D.C. Circuit Judge Kavanaugh: “[T]he CFPB is unconstitutionally structured because it is an independent agency headed
by a single Director.”16
Between 2016 and 2018, these aforementioned alleged constitutional infirmities were argued in a variety of courts, but almost every court found them unpersuasive or insufficient to declare the CFPB’s structure unconstitutional.17 The most direct
-increase-mortgage-credit-access-in-communities-illegally-redlined (announcing CFPB’s settlement with Hudson City Savings Bank for “$27 Million to Increase Mortgage Credit Access in Communities Illegally Redlined”).
16. PHH Corp. v. CFPB (PHH-1), No. 15-1177, slip op. at 36 (D.C. Cir. Oct.
11, 2016) (vacated).
17. Courts have consistently held that the CFPB structure is constitutional. See CFPB v. Think Fin., LLC, No. CV-17-127-GF-BMM, 2018 WL
3707911, at *2 (D. Mont. Aug. 3, 2018); CFPB v. All Am. Check Cashing, Inc.,
No. 3:16-CV-356-WHB-JCG, at *2–4 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 27, 2018) (holding the
CFPB structure as constitutional with interlocutory appeal on constitutional
question granted Mar. 27, 2018); CFPB v. Nationwide Biweekly Admin., Inc.,
No. 15-CV-2106-RS, 2017 WL 3948396, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2017), appeal
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and engaged constitutional challenge, PHH v. CFPB, first produced a divided D.C. Circuit panel decision (PHH-1) that found
the CFPB’s structure unconstitutional,18 then a divided en banc
decision (PHH-2) that found otherwise.19 But, on June 8, 2018,
Director Mick Mulvaney dismissed the underlying enforcement
action in PHH-2.20
Although nothing is ever certain in the certiorari process, let
me make a bold prediction: the constitutional challenge to the
CFPB will soon reach the Supreme Court.21 And, there is reason
docketed, No. 18-15431 (9th Cir. Mar. 15, 2018); CFPB v. TCF Nat’l Bank, No.
17-166 (RHK/DTS), 2017 WL 6211033, at *1 (D. Minn. Sept. 8, 2017); CFPB v.
Seila Law, LLC, No. 8:17-CV-01081-JLS-JEM, 2017 WL 6536586, at *1 (C.D.
Cal. Aug. 25, 2017), appeal docketed, No. 17-56324 (9th Cir. Sept. 1, 2017);
CFPB v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-CV-101, 2017 WL 3380530, at *1 (M.D. Pa.
Aug. 4, 2017); CFPB v. Future Income Payments, LLC, 252 F. Supp. 3d 961
(C.D. Cal. 2017), stayed pending appeal, No. 17-55721, 2017 WL 2622774 (9th
Cir. June 1, 2017); CFPB v. NDG Fin. Corp., No. 15-CV-5211 (CM), 2016 WL
7188792, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2016), reconsideration denied, No. 15-CV-5211
(CM), 2016 WL 7742784 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2016); CFPB v. CashCall, Inc., No.
CV-15-7522-JFW-RAOx, 2016 WL 4820635, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2016), appeal filed, No. 18-55479, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 12, 2018); CFPB v. ITT Educ. Servs.,
Inc., 219 F. Supp. 3d 878 (S.D. Ind. 2015), appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, No.15-1761, 2016 WL 9447163, at *1 (7th Cir. 2016); CFPB v. Frederick J.
Hanna & Assocs., 114 F. Supp. 3d 1342 (N.D. Ga. 2015); CFPB v. Morgan
Drexen, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2014). But see CFPB v. RD Legal
Funding, No. 17-CV-890 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2018) (presently on appeal);
CFPB v. D&D Mktg., No. 2:15-CV-09692, 2016 WL 8849698, at *1 (C.D. Cal.
Nov. 17, 2016), interlocutory appeal granted, No. 17-55709, 2017 WL 597428
(9th Cir. May 17, 2017) (including an initial finding that the CFPB is unconstitutional). Both of these two cases rely on PHH-1 for their analysis.
18. See PHH-1, slip op.
19. PHH Corp, v. CFPB (PHH-2), No. 15-177, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Jan. 31,
2018) (en banc).
20. See In the Matter of PHH Corp., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0002 (2018) (ordering dismissal of underlying charges in PHH-2 at the request of Acting CFPB
Director Mulvaney).
21. Court practitioners and academics have settled on a number of reasons
that make cert more likely for any case, chief among them: divisions between
lower courts (particularly between circuits), an issue of nationwide importance,
and a misapplication of Supreme Court precedent. All of these are arguably present with respect to the CFPB’s constitutional challenges. See, e.g., Diane L.
McGimsey & Judson O. Littleton, Expert Q&A on Seeking or Opposing Certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, THOMSON REUTERS: PRAC. L. (2018), https://
www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/McGimsey_Littleton_Practical_Law_
Certiorari_Supreme_Court_2018.pdf (discussing cert grant factors). And, in
January and March 2019, respectively, two courts evaluating challenges to the
CFPB on constitutional grounds heard oral arguments. See CFPB v. Seila Law,
LLC, No. 8:17-CV-01081-JLS-JEM, 2017 WL 6536586 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2017),
appeal docketed, No. 17-56324 (9th Cir. Sept. 1, 2017); see also CFPB v. All Am.
Check Cashing, Inc., No. 3:16-CV-356-WHB-JCG (5th Cir. 2019).
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for the CFPB’s advocates to be concerned over the Court’s response. The chief constitutional critic of the CFPB happens to be
newly appointed Justice Brett Kavanaugh, who authored PHH1 and vigorously dissented in PHH-2.22 Further, some scholars
and judges have suggested a recent Supreme Court case, Free
Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board (Free
Enterprise),23 discussed below, indicates that the Court may now
welcome a wholesale revision to its Article II jurisprudence, consistent with Justice Kavanaugh’s broad approach. So, despite a
hundred years of executive agency jurisprudence, which could
(or should) have provided clarity, the continued existence of the
CFPB is an open constitutional question. Therefore, in the midst
of a national debate about the CFPB’s effectiveness and legitimacy, with at least one Supreme Court Justice convinced of its
constitutional failings, and a symposium dedicated to reflecting
on Dodd-Frank ten years later, now is an ideal time to situate
the CFPB within the Supreme Court’s 100 years of executive
agency jurisprudence. Further, constitutional attacks on the
CFPB should also worry those who value the federal government’s ability to create and sustain independent administrative
agencies that are free from congressional and executive control
in turbulent political times.
This Article proceeds as follows. First, the Article traces a
history of the Supreme Court’s executive agency jurisprudence
and outlines a framework to understand where the Bureau is
situated in relation to prior precedents. Next, the Article focuses
on reframing the debate by situating the CFPB’s constitutionality within the foundational executive agency case, Humphrey’s
Executor. Following that, it analyzes the D.C. Circuit’s dual opinions in PHH-1 and PHH-2, focusing on defending the CFPB from
its legal critics. Concluding briefly, for reasons different than
many of its critics, the Article calls for a revision to the CFPB’s
structure by changing to the five-member commissioner structure common among other regulatory agencies. Switching to a
five-member commission may also solve, in part, any remaining
open questions surrounding the constitutionality of the Bureau’s
structure, notwithstanding that it already survives constitutional muster. Further, the CFPB will be more effective in its
22. See, e.g., Emily Stewart, Consumer Advocacy Groups Are Extremely
Worried About Brett Kavanaugh, VOX (July 11, 2018), https://www.vox.com/
policy-and-politics/2018/7/11/17556120/brett-kavanaugh-elizabeth-warren-cfpb
-regulations.
23. 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
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mission for many reasons, including one often ignored by proponents and critics: a five-member commission structure is more
likely to be comprised of a diversity of voices, which will lead to
a broader and more inclusive perspective on the Bureau’s mission, because, in part, it will more accurately reflect the diversity
of the consumer marketplace that the CFPB regulates.24
I. 100 YEARS OF SOLITUDE: INDEPENDENT AGENCIES
AND THE CONSTITUTION
The roots of the CFPB’s constitutional crisis began more
than a century ago. The Smithsonian Institution and the Interstate Commerce Commission, two of the earliest independent executive agencies, were formed in the mid-1800s.25 The trend of
distributing power and responsibility to “independent” government agencies operating outside of the traditional three-branch
structure accelerated through the 1930s as President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt and his New Deal sought to enhance federal
power. The trend was effectuated through numerous government-sponsored programs, administered through bureaucratic
agencies, and regulated through others.26
Independent executive agencies differ from traditional executive agencies in a few ways, but for our purposes—most importantly—their agency heads are not typically subject to the atwill presidential removal power, which is derived from Article II
and Supreme Court interpretations of the Article’s limits.27
24. See, e.g., David A. Carter et al., Corporate Governance, Board Diversity,
and Firm Value, 38 FIN. REV. 33 (2003) (examining the relationship between
board diversity and a company’s firm value for the Fortune 1000 group of companies).
25. Interstate Commerce Commission, FED. REG., https://www.federalregis
ter.gov/agencies/interstate-commerce-commission (last visited April 14, 2019)
(noting the Interstate Commerce Commission was the first regulatory commission in U.S. history and was established in the 1880s); Our Organization,
SMITHSONIAN, https://www.si.edu/about/administration (last visited April 14,
2019) (noting that the Smithsonian Institution was established by Congress in
1846).
26. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1933–1945,
LIBR. CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/teachers/classroommaterials/
presentationsandactivities/presentations/timeline/depwwii/newdeal (last visited April 14, 2019); see also JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
70 (1966).
27. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. (“He shall have Power, by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United
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Scholars and courts agree that Article II, Section II provides for
a robust appointment power—and thus an inherent removal
power. But while acknowledging that Section III requires that
the President “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,”28
they disagree intensely about the broad contours of each Section,
particularly when applied to independent agencies. Since part of
ensuring faithful execution of the laws must involve the ability
to remove senior agency political appointees to ensure consistent
application of the law, a broad argument for presidential power
under Article II suggests that Congress may not place limits on
the President’s ability to remove appointees who serve in an executive capacity and are approved by the Senate.
Thus, the history of constitutional challenges relevant to independent agencies like the CFPB rests on a constitutional analysis that is both fixed and evolving. Earlier cases like Humphrey’s Executor,29 discussed below, wrestled with broader
questions of agency design and whether the Constitution permitted independent agencies to exist at all, absent a clear home for
them within one of the three branches of government. Earlier
and later cases also confronted Article II questions—namely,
whether the executive’s responsibility to faithfully execute the
law or the executive’s appointment power were encroached upon
by the relevant agency’s design or by Congress eliminating the
President’s power to remove political appointees. Some later
cases bypassed the design question to focus more squarely on the
type of removal provision and whether the absence or presence
of certain removal terms was inconsistent with Article II. When
an unconstitutional structure was found, these cases looked next
at what the appropriate remedy would be—either the removal of
the impermissible restriction, or the invalidation of the entire

States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which
shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in
the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3
(“He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the
Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge
necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both
Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with
Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he
shall think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he
shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all
the Officers of the United States.”).
28. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
29. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
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agency. Though not universally agreed upon, it is generally accepted that Humphrey’s is still the primary authority on both
questions—subject to the interpretation of how later cases
change the removal analysis and the remedy. Therefore, it is
useful to situate this framework within the evolving line of independent agency jurisprudence, which begins with Myers v.
United States.
A. MYERS AND HUMPHREY’S—THE CONSTITUTIONAL
FRAMEWORK
The first Supreme Court case to address the constitutionality of an independent agency’s structure focused on whether the
President could remove an agency’s head at will despite goodcause restrictions.30 In Myers, the President directed that Postmaster Frank S. Myers be terminated before his term was finished.31 Myers contended that there had been no good cause for
his removal and that the removal was thus invalid.32 The Myers
Court held that the President had the power to remove, for any
reason, any postmaster he had appointed with the advice and
consent of the Senate, without regard to “cause.”33 The Myers
Court relied on the power of removal inherent in the general Article II appointment power and determined that any condition
that stopped the President from utilizing his full constitutional
powers to see the law faithfully executed was unconstitutional.34
Nine years after Myers, Humphrey’s substantially refined
the scope of the executive power of removal, specifically in the
context of independent agency constitutionality.35 The Humphrey’s decision arose out of President Roosevelt’s attempt to remove William Humphrey, a Commissioner of the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC or Commission), shortly after the President
took office.36 The Humphrey’s Court reviewed provisions of the
Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) to evaluate whether
its design was constitutional and whether the “for-cause” removal restrictions for FTC Commissioners unduly restricted or
30. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 106–08 (1926).
31. Id. Myers was a Senate-confirmed “first-class” Postmaster in Oregon
and was removed by the Postmaster General at the direction of the President
prior to the expiration of his term. Id. at 106.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 163–64.
34. Id. at 163–66.
35. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
36. Id. at 618–19.
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limited President Roosevelt’s Article II powers.37 The Humphrey’s Court then determined that the FTC Act did indeed restrict
the presidential power of removal because it required one or
more specified causes to justify removal.38 The Court, using a
four-part analysis, nonetheless held that these provisions, because of the agency’s design features and independence, were
constitutionally valid.39 The four-part “Humphrey’s Test” for determining an agency’s constitutional “independence” asks
whether the agency: (1) is nonpartisan; (2) deals with uniquely
expert subject matter or skills; and engages in duties which function as either (3) quasi-judicial or (4) quasi-legislative tasks.40
The Court thus effectively required that an initial inquiry into
whether an “independent” government agency is constitutional
should begin with the four-part framework prior to and separate
from determining whether an official’s removal process violates
Article II.
Humphrey’s and Myers considered similar factual scenarios
regarding the President’s power to remove the head of an executive agency, but diverged in defining the scope of that power.41
Whereas the reasoning in Myers favored an unrestricted view of
the executive power of removal regardless of the commission’s
character, Humphrey’s, while not overruling Myers directly, declined to recognize a broad and unlimited Article II executive removal power.42 Instead, the Court in Humphrey’s drew a distinction between the wholly executive functions of the postmaster
involved in Myers, and the quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
hybrid functions of the Commissioner of the FTC. Meaning, its
validation of the FTC’s design and independence mitigated some
Article II concerns.43 Humphrey’s has since been interpreted to
mean that the President may not remove independent agency
commissioners for political reasons. Rather, he is restricted to
instances where there is good cause (defined as “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office”).44
Ten years later, in Wiener v. United States, the Court clarified that Humphrey’s, not Myers, remained the appropriate
37. Id. at 619.
38. Id. at 626.
39. Id. at 627–31.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 618–19; Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 106–08 (1926).
42. See Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 627–31; Myers, 272 U.S. at 163–66.
43. See Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 629. The Commissioner of the FTC
was responsible for adjudicatory duties. Id.
44. Id.
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benchmark.45 The Court narrowly confined the scope of the Myers decision to include only “purely executive officers” like the
postmaster and held that the Court “‘disapproved’ the expressions in Myers supporting the President’s inherent constitutional power to remove members of quasi-judicial bodies.”46 In
short, Wiener clarifies that if an independent agency’s design engages multiple functions pursuant to the Humphrey’s framework
and if Congress’s intent regarding removal is clear, agency head
removal restrictions are constitutionally sound.47
B. THE HALF-CENTURY CASES: BOWSHER AND MORRISON
A half-century after Humphrey’s, the Reagan Administration’s anti-regulatory agenda necessitated that it, first, vigorously defend the executive’s Article II powers and, second, ask
the Supreme Court to finally find independent agencies unconstitutional.48 The administration’s arguments somewhat shifted
the nature of the inquiry from the Humphrey’s test’s four parts
to the specific position of the agency head within the hierarchy;
namely, whether he or she is a principal officer or an inferior
officer subject to the President’s control.49 This is important because, per the Appointments Clause, the President is charged
with appointment, and, by implication, removal, of all principal
officers of the United States. Conversely, inferior officers can be
appointed by Congress, a congressional delegation of power to
the President, or a department head.50 If an agency’s removal or
appointment process does not comport with the Appointments
Clause, that process is unconstitutional because it either raises
Article II concerns or implicates separation of powers principles.
The Reagan Administration’s opportunity to challenge
Humphrey’s came in Bowsher v. Synar, where provisions of the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 empowering the Comptroller General to prepare and submit a report detailing deficit reductions for a fiscal year were challenged
45. See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
46. Id. at 352.
47. Id. at 353–54.
48. See infra notes 51–72 and accompanying text. The administration’s actions during a Congressional investigation, pursuant to the counsel of Office of
Legal Counsel head Ted Olson, also led to another landmark (but oft-critiqued)
executive power case, Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). This case is discussed infra notes 58–72 and accompanying text.
49. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 672–77; Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 718–24
(1986); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120–29 (1976).
50. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 672–77.
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as unconstitutional.51 Only Congress was able to remove the
Comptroller General, and only by impeachment or through a
joint resolution due to good cause.52 Responsibility for execution
of the Act was reserved to the Comptroller General while Congress retained ultimate control over that execution.53 Because of
these provisions, the Justice Department made two arguments:
first, that Congress could not grant itself removal power over an
executive officer; and second, that the President must have the
power to remove the Comptroller General at will because he performs executive functions.54 The second of these arguments’ success would have been considered a major victory for the Reagan
Administration, and would have reinvigorated Myers for the first
time in over fifty years.
Instead, the Bowsher Court determined that the Comptroller General had been unconstitutionally delegated executive
powers because Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of
removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws,
other than through impeachment.55 While acknowledging that
Congress cannot delegate itself power to remove an executive officer, the Court declined to hold that the President must have
unrestrained removal power over all executive officers.56 In so
ruling, the Humphrey’s “for-cause” analysis was largely reinforced as precedent.57
In Morrison, the Assistant Attorney General for the Office
of Legal Counsel (Ted Olson) sued an independent counsel who
had been given authority to investigate whether the attorney
general violated federal law.58 Olson argued that the Office took
executive powers away from the President and assigned them to
a fourth branch of government that was not answerable to anyone, implicating Article II and separation of powers principles.59
But the Court held that the independent counsel provision of the
Act did not violate separation of powers principles because although the President’s removal power was restrained, the restraint did not cause power to flow to another branch.60 Although
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 719.
Id. at 720.
Id. at 732–33.
Id. at 719–21.
Id. at 726.
Id. at 760 (White, J., dissenting).
See id. at 739–40.
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 665–69 (1988).
Id. at 660.
Id. at 673–77.

2019]

CONSTITUTIONALIZING PROTECTION

2441

the independent counsel had discretion to disagree with the attorney general and ultimately prevent executive control, which
may seem to imply the individual is a principal officer, the Act
implied the agency head sits in a relatively inferior position because it authorized the attorney general to remove the counsel.61
Furthermore, because the nature of the duties performed by the
independent counsel was largely investigative, and the duration
of those duties was limited and defined, they did not qualify as
quasi-legislative under a Humphrey’s analysis.62
The Morrison Court determined that an inferior officer, as
categorized by the Appointments Clause, possesses the following
three characteristics: that officer (1) is subject to removal by a
higher executive branch official; (2) is empowered by the Act to
perform only certain, limited duties; and (3) holds an office that
is limited in jurisdiction and limited in tenure.63 When analyzing
the principal/inferior officer distinction using the Morrison
standard, if an individual agency head meets all three of the requirements, that person is an inferior officer whose appointment—and thus removal—is not solely within the purview of the
executive branch.64 Conversely, if an agency head fails to meet
any of the prongs, the person/position is a principal officer.65
The Morrison Court also rejected the argument that the
good-cause protections were unconstitutional infringements on
the President’s power.66 The Court dismissed the view that the
use of executive power itself prohibits Congress from prescribing
good-cause removal qualifications.67 In this regard, the Court
questioned the basis for earlier decisions in Myers and Humphrey’s that whether the officer must be removable at will turned
solely on whether the agency was responsible for purely executive duties or those of a quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial nature.68 Instead, the Court found the key question to be whether
“the removal restrictions are of such a nature that they impede
the President’s ability to perform his constitutional duty.”69
When the Court applied this test, it found that in practice it was
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 670–72.
Id.
Id. at 671–72.
Id. at 671–74.
Id. at 671–73.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 688–90.
Id. at 690.
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unlikely that good-cause restrictions would significantly inhibit
the President’s ability to see the law faithfully executed.70 In doing this, the Morrison Court somewhat weakened its decision by
reasoning that there remained ample authority for the executive
to ensure subordinate officers were competent. While maintaining the constitutionality of independent agencies, the just-cause
provisions now must be interpreted to leave the President significant power to terminate and influence those whom the provisions protect.71 Later cases, including Buckley and Mistretta,
have raised Article II and separation of powers concerns, though
neither applies directly to the CFPB’s present predicament.72
C. THE LATEST WRINKLE—FREE ENTERPRISE
The most recent iteration of this constitutional discourse
about Article II removal power involves the complexity of a removal power restriction.73 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act created the
five-member Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB) to improve accounting oversight and authorized the
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) to select the PCAOB
board members.74 In Free Enterprise, a nonprofit organization
and an accounting firm claimed that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act defied both separation of powers principles and the Appointments
Clause in how it structured the PCAOB’s removal process.75 The
PCAOB board members were separated from the President’s
reach by two degrees: first through the inclusion of a for-cause
removal provision, and second, by vesting decision-making
power for removal in the SEC, rather than in the President.76
The Supreme Court held that the dual for-cause limitations on
removal were constitutionally infirm because they ultimately
70. Id. at 691–92.
71. See id.
72. Buckley’s Article II analysis revolved around limitations on the President’s appointment power, not the removal power. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976). Mistretta’s analysis centered in part on finding a non-delegation
of Congressional power, an issue not present with respect to the CFPB. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 362, 371–80 (1989).
73. See generally Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.,
561 U.S. 477 (2010).
74. More broadly, the PCAOB’s mission is “to oversee the audits of public
companies . . . in order to protect investors and further the public interest in the
preparation of informative, accurate, and independent audit reports.” See Mission, Vision, and Values, PCAOB, https://pcaobus.org/About/History/Pages/
mission-vision-values.aspx (last visited April 14, 2019).
75. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 487.
76. Id. at 484–87.
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prohibited the President from controlling subservient executive
officers.77
Free Enterprise offered the most extensive discussion of
presidential power over the structure of administrative agencies
since Myers. It held that the relationship between the President,
the SEC, and the PCAOB was inconsistent with the President’s
Article II powers.78 In doing so, the Court did not rely on any of
the common reasons used in past decisions for determining
whether an agency’s design features were unconstitutional.
Whereas in earlier cases only one level of good-cause protection separated the President from removing the individual officer, Free Enterprise reasoned that a second degree of separation, which resulted in the President not being able to decide
whether the requisite cause exists, is unconstitutional because
it effectively removes the President from direct influence over
removal altogether.79 In the earlier cases in which agency structure was deemed constitutional, a single layer of separation had
existed where the President—or a subordinate that he could remove at will—could judge conduct to determine if good cause existed for removal.80 The second layer, in its obstruction of the
executive’s Article II duty to see that the law be faithfully executed, is unconstitutional.81 The primary issue was not that Congress retained too much control (as in Bowsher), but rather that
it did not provide the President enough control.82
Thus, the constitutional issue with the PCAOB did not
emerge merely because a good-cause provision existed. Rather,
it was the addition of the second inhibiting provision that further
removed the President from the decision-making process.83
While a single level of protection still allows the President to
make a good-cause assessment, the vesting of the judgment process outside the direct control of the executive leaves the President helpless and unable to intervene.84 Although able to review
the outside agency’s good-cause decision, his opinion would be
meaningless unless the good-cause determination made was a

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 492.
Id. at 495.
Id. at 501.
Id. at 494–96.
Id. at 490–92.
Id. at 513–14.
Id.
Id. at 495–97.
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gross neglect of duty.85 Thus, even without Congress delegating
removal power or appointment power to itself, or retaining a veto
power over the agencies’ actions, the PCAOB’s design was unconstitutional.86 However, even after deeming the dual for-cause
limitations to contravene the Constitution’s separation of powers, Free Enterprise determined the restrictions to be severable
from the statute and the remainder enforceable.87
The holding of Free Enterprise did not concern the novelty of
the administrative design (the structure itself), but rather
whether the removal structure contravened the Constitution by
substantially burdening the President in meeting his Article II
charge to see that the law is faithfully executed.88 Instead of the
usual issue in constitutional removal challenges—Congress
vesting removal power in itself—Free Enterprise involved vesting the remaining removal power in a separate body, an agency
that was not compelled to follow the position urged by the President.89 But a removal or design feature can be new or atypical
while still enabling the President to meet all of his constitutional
obligations. While novelty can theoretically be weighed as a
small component of the constitutional analysis, it should not
supplant accepted precedent as the primary determinant. This
is true for a number of reasons, and therefore “legislative novelty
is not evidence and should not be used as evidence that a statute
is unconstitutional on federalism or separation-of-powers
grounds.”90
Seeing Free Enterprise as a long overdue redemption of Myers is misguided. Free Enterprise represents an outer limit, setting a specific, appropriate boundary for how much Congress can
limit the President’s removal powers beyond “for cause.”91 Further, the unusual relationship design among the President, the
85. Id. at 496–97.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 510–25.
88. Id. at 483–84.
89. See id. Vesting in a separate non-branch body is different than earlier
Supreme Court cases where the removal power remained within the legislative
branch or one of its agents. Whereas those cases highlighted that Congress retaining power intended for the executive was unconstitutional, Free Enterprise
instead focused on the lack of power that remained with the President. See generally id.
90. Leah M. Litman, Debunking Antinovelty, 66 DUKE L.J. 1407, 1412
(2017) (tracing the rise of the statutory-novelty-is-presumptively-constitutionally-bad jurisprudence and concluding that courts’ more frequent invocations of
novelty as proof of unconstitutionality lack evidence).
91. Free Enterprise is applicable in the rare instance where the agency head
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SEC, and the PCAOB should prevent widespread adoption of its
holding as applied to the CFPB.92 Because the structure of the
agency-design at issue in Free Enterprise (the PCAOB) was extremely unusual, that case’s holding is limited to a narrow set of
circumstances centered on the double-burdened removal
power.93 The CFPB, and every other independent agency that is
subject to removal restrictions, vests the remaining power in the
President alone.94 Thus, the CFPB, the Federal Reserve, and the
President have a sufficiently dissimilar relationship from that
present in Free Enterprise.95 Two layers of separation for removal is not the same as one.96 No independent agency head,
including the Director of the CFPB, is afforded as much protection from Presidential oversight as was true in Free Enterprise,
and thus the case’s application to the CFPB is particularly suspect.
D. FROM HUMPHREY’S TO FREE ENTERPRISE—THE UNITARY
EXECUTIVE FRAMEWORK
The aforementioned post-Humphrey’s cases have at their
core one fundamental philosophical principle embedded within
an Article II constitutional lens. Much of the critique of independent agencies from Humphrey’s to Free Enterprise centers
around a scholarly approach called the unified or unitary executive model and determining whether the Supreme Court’s
agency jurisprudence discussed above is consistent with that approach.97 Within that tradition, scholars argue that the Constitution demands that the executive branch should be recognized
as a large, bureaucratic institution that recognizes the chief executive as sitting at the top of that institution. Like any corporation, the organizational structure of a unitary executive would
in question is beyond direct presidential control by multiple layers. Free Enter.
Fund, 561 U.S. at 547.
92. Id. at 478–90.
93. See id. at 483–92.
94. The President can remove the Director for “inefficiency, neglect of duty,
or malfeasance in office.” 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3) (2012).
95. See, e.g., Hans Bader, Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB: Narrow Separation-of-Powers Ruling Illustrates That the Supreme Court Is Not “Pro-Business”, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 269 (2010), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/
serials/files/supreme-courtreview/2010/9/bader-pcaob_0.pdf.
96. See id. at 277.
97. See Morton Rosenberg, Whatever Happened to Congressional Review of
Agency Rulemaking: A Brief Overview, Assessment, and Proposal for Reform, 51
ADMIN. L. REV. 1051 (1999) for a richer discussion of this debate and the definition that follows.
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resemble a pyramid, and according to some scholars, our Constitution demands it.98 Executive hierarchy is the governing principle of this framework, as best exemplified by Justice Scalia’s
dissent in Morrison.99
As these advocates see it, because Article II provides that
the chief executive must see that the laws are faithfully executed, the President has the obligation to ensure that his orders
are followed by his chosen high-level officials.100 These scholars
and advocates view the President, given his role as the nationally elected official head of the federal government, as possessing
tremendously broad supervisory, managerial, administrative,
and enforcement powers over all administrative agencies.101
Therefore, the President sits at the top of the executive pyramid
and all administrative agencies must be subject to his control.
Scholars, judges, and political leaders celebrate this approach for
many reasons, one of which is that such an arrangement makes
for efficient government. The chief executive can set coherent
priorities, allocate limited resources, balance competing policy
goals, and resolve both inter- and intra-agency conflicts effectively and efficiently when he has complete corporate governance authority entrusted to him.
But Supreme Court agency jurisprudence has largely rejected this approach, notwithstanding well-known critiques
lauded by scholars and judges alike.102 Agency jurisprudence relies (correctly) on valuing administrative competency, as exemplified in Humphrey’s. Contemporary accounts of the growth of
the administrative state during the mid-1900s reinforce this
view.103 But the theoretical underpinnings of administrative
98. See Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as Power Grants, 88 NW.
U. L. REV. 1377, 1378–86 (1994); Frank B. Cross, Executive Orders 12,291 and
12,498: A Test Case in Presidential Control of Executive Agencies, 4 J.L. & POL.
483, 499–504 (1988); Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 14–15 (1993); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 573, 597–99, 643–50 (1984).
99. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697–734 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
100. Indeed, many scholars have long argued that Presidents were granted
deliberately broad and persuasive mechanisms for executive branch control. See
generally, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrisha B. Prakash, The President’s
Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994).
101. See Strauss, supra note 98, at 609.
102. See generally id.
103. See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 15 (1938); see
also Stephen Breyer, Problems and Possibilities in the Administrative State—
Afterword, 92 YALE L.J. 1614, 1615–16 (1983).
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competency, as seen in cases like Humphrey’s, were indeed
slightly undermined over time as agencies branched out beyond
their expertise to make decisions that “may properly belong in
the political rather than the regulatory sphere.”104 Perhaps holacracy, not hierarchy, is the most effective framework for analysis.105
Notwithstanding certain protestations, there is ample evidence that the framers of the Constitution wanted to limit the
President’s authority over various officials who would implement Congress’s laws.106 Historical accounts demonstrate that
the power of presidential removal was not even discussed formally at the constitutional convention.107 Presidents have respected this “anti-removal” framework, more or less, since its inception.108 Independent agencies exist for a reason—they do
their best work supported by field experts, freed from political
winds, and in specific tasks, functions, and industries that Congress deems it appropriate to regulate. In recent times, perhaps
there is such a thing as too much concentrated executive power.
This is why it is important to remember that advocates of a unified executive framework operate theoretically, inasmuch as evidence of the framers’ intent to create a hierarchical all-powerful
executive is contradicted by much historical evidence. While a
unified executive might be more efficient through the lens of theory, “it cannot be disputed that the original understanding of the
presidency called for much less presidential authority than is
104. See Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L.
REV. 407, 426 (1990).
105. Holacracy, the organizational structure adopted by Zappos and other
organizations, allows for “distributed decision making while giving everyone the
opportunity to work on what they do best.” See Jacob Morgan, The 5 Types of
Organizational Structures: Part 5, Holacratic Organizations, FORBES (July 20,
2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2015/07/20/the-5-types-of
-organizational-structures-part-5-holacratic-organizations/#478fe5a548a2. An
emphasis on distributed expert functions, with collaboration, produces better
decision making without executive oversight. Id.; see also, e.g., Matthew T.
Bodie, Holacracy in Corporate Law, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 619, 624 (2018).
106. See generally the extensive discussion in Lawrence Lessig & Cass R.
Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994).
107. M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION (1911); see
also THE FEDERALIST No. 77, at 459 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
108. More recently—even as the “unified executive” model became more
prominent within certain circles—Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan all refrained from including independent agencies within the scope of executive orders concerned with using a cost/benefit analysis to shape regulatory policy. See
Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1982); Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R.
§ 152 (1979); Exec. Order No. 11,821, 3 C.F.R. § 203 (1974).
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taken for granted today.”109 Instead, as advocates of the CFPB
see it, to be independent is to be mission-centered. And to be independent in this fractured political climate might be more important than ever. For all of the above reasons, the Supreme
Court rightly set out the appropriate precedential framework in
Humphrey’s.
II. VIEWING THE CFBP THROUGH THE PROPER LENS:
HUMPHREY’S
There has been only one Supreme Court decision in the
eighty-four years preceding Free Enterprise holding a removal
restriction to be unconstitutional and none that explicitly rejected an agency’s design as constitutionally defective. Thus, the
design framework presented in Humphrey’s and molded over the
last century has guided all of the prior Supreme Court decisions
and is the essential component of any analysis.110
The initial step in the Humphrey’s analysis, which looks at
whether an agency’s removal structure is constitutional, is to determine the nature of the core functions that the agency performs.111 In instances where the activity is wholly executive in
nature, Humphrey’s and Myers agree that the executive power of
removal—inherent in the appointment power—cannot be inhibited.112 Further, if the activities are considered quasi-legislative
or quasi-judicial, a just-cause provision qualifying the presidential removal power comports with the Constitution.113 As other
cases following Humphrey’s have shown, even without an explicit provision disallowing removal for political disagreement,
the principle is deemed implicit.114 Thus, when dealing with an
independent agency engaged in activities outside the executive
109. Cass R. Sunstein, An Eighteenth Century Presidency in a Twenty-First
Century World, 48 ARK. L. REV. 1, 3 (1995).
110. Indeed, Humphrey’s is cited on the first page of the PHH-2 decision,
even prior to the introduction. See PHH-2, No. 15-177, slip op. at 5 (D.C. Cir.
Jan. 31, 2018) (en banc); see also Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769,
778 (2013) (noting that the constitutional status of independent agencies stems
from Humphrey’s); Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV.
41, 94 (1986) (noting Humphrey’s has been viewed as the fundamental constitutional charter of the independent regulatory commissions).
111. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 618–32 (1935).
112. Id. at 618–32; Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 106–08 (1926).
113. Myers, 272 U.S. at 135.
114. See, e.g., Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1398 (D.D.C. 1986),
aff ’ d, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (noting that Humphrey’s “sought to provide wholesale . . . protection against political intervention”).
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sphere, legislation can prevent the President from utilizing atwill removal power.
In addition to the nature of the activities performed, the
court in Humphrey’s reasoned that in order for an independent
agency to comfortably fit within a separation of powers framework, that agency must be nonpartisan and possess some unique
expertise in the area.115 Considering this, the Humphrey’s analysis can be further broken down into four component questions.
Does the agency have a prevailing political ideology or partisan
leaning? Does the agency possess a particular expertise or
knowledge regarding the subject matter under the purview of
the agency? Does the agency perform legislative responsibilities?
And does the agency perform judicial duties?116 Answering these
four questions should determine whether the agency’s “independent” design is constitutional and whether such structure
may impermissibly constrain removal power.117
A. THE CFPB AS AN INDEPENDENT, NONPARTISAN, EXPERT,
QUASI-LEGISLATIVE, QUASI-JUDICIAL BODY
The CFPB is entrusted with an extensive set of duties that—
in its different capacities—touch not only executive activity, but
legislative and judicial ones as well.118 Executive duties are
those which further the executive’s responsibility to see that the
law is faithfully executed, and include law enforcement roles.119
Legislative responsibility is rule- or law-making power.120 The
judiciary’s duty is to resolve disputes.121 The CFPB’s responsibilities include creating and enforcing rules for financial institutions, examining bank activity, overseeing financial product and
service creation, monitoring American markets, and receiving,
115. Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 624.
116. See id. at 618–35.
117. See id. While these four components must be considered to satisfy the
Humphrey’s analysis, their consideration only represents the initial method
used by the Supreme Court to determine whether an agency is constitutionally
independent from the executive. Throughout the last fifty years, the Court has
used different cases to extend or transform that analysis, depending on other
factors discussed infra. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting, 561 U.S. 477,
483–92 (2010); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 672–75 (1988); Bowsher v.
Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 717–24 (1986); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120–29 (1976).
118. The CFPB engages in law enforcement duties, law making duties, and
conflict resolution duties. See About Us: The Bureau, CFPB, http://www
.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau (last visited April 14, 2019).
119. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 106–08 (1926).
120. Id.
121. Id.
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resolving, and analyzing consumer complaints.122 These duties
define the CFPB’s nature, and encompass all three branches of
the federal government. It is therefore not merely an executive
agency, but an independent quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
body.123 In order to determine if the removal structure of the
CFPB is constitutional, these characteristics must be considered.
1. Nonpartisan
One of the main pillars of Humphrey’s is that an independent commission must be designed to be nonpartisan and free
from political or branch influence.124 This serves as a way to ensure its actions are neutral and objective.125 The CFPB, situated
within the Federal Reserve (itself an insulated, nonpartisan
body), is largely independent from both the executive and legislative branches. Whereas Congress is typically responsible for
budget appropriations and allocation, the CFPB largely operates
outside of those controls.126 Similarly, because of the just-cause
provision regarding presidential removal, the CFPB director is
free of coercive influence from the executive branch. Because the
CFPB is largely an independent creature operating outside the
direct control of Congress or the President, it comports with the
first requirement of the Humphrey’s four-part analysis.
But, various commentators still imply that the CFPB is partisan, with a clear ideological line dividing its perceived support
from Democrats and detractions by Republicans.127 Although the
CFPB may seem partisan because of the ideological divide in
support from members of Congress, the relative enthusiasm of
122. About Us: The Bureau, supra note 118.
123. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 618–32 (1935) (discussing characteristics of agencies that act with quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial duties).
124. See id. at 624; see also Daniel A. Crane, Debunking Humphrey’s Executor, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1835, 1837 (2015) (arguing that the assumptions
about the FTC in Humphrey’s are no longer true).
125. Crane, supra note 124, at 1852.
126. 12 U.S.C. § 5497 (2012). But see Press Release, Fin. Servs. Comm.,
CFPB Lacks Oversight and Accountability (June 18, 2013), https://web.archive
.org/web/20170516101416/http://financialservices.house.gov/news/
documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=339512 (critiquing this structure).
127. Michael Hiltzik, Consumer Protection: Why Do Republicans Hate the
CFPB So Much?, L.A. TIMES (July 23, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/business/
hiltzik/la-fi-mh-cfpb-republicans-20150723-column.html. But if regulating consumer finance is inherently ideological, why isn’t regulating “trade” or “commerce,” or being a member of the Federal Reserve system also inherently ideological?
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the major parties for the agency’s mission is not the type of partisan behavior intended to be considered in the Humphrey’s analysis.128 Prior to the recent ascension of Director Mulvaney, Republicans denounced the CFPB as a “runaway agency” and
advocated its abolishment,129 but the Bureau itself is isolated
from influence and does not reflect a material ideological bias in
its function.130 The rules and requirements prescribed by the
CFPB are not inherently more favorable to a particular ideological lean, but rather are aimed at providing financial protection
to all consumers without regard to party affiliation or region.131
The disputes resolved and remedies provided do not favor a partisan bias, but reflect a concern for consumers as an undivided
group.132 This fact, in addition to the agency’s separation from
both congressional appropriation review and executive at-will
removal, satisfies the objectivity requirements of Humphrey’s
and confirms the CFPB as an independent, nonpartisan body.133
Humphrey’s next requires an inquiry into the expertise associated with the agency.134

128. See Crane, supra note 124, at 1843–46 (noting that nonpartisan behavior is evaluated in light of political decisional modes).
129. Hiltzik, supra note 127.
130. But see Phil Hall, Study Shows CFPB Staff Donations Aimed at Democratic Candidates, NAT’L MORTGAGE PROF. MAG. (Nov. 28, 2017), https://
nationalmortgageprofessional.com/news/65240/study-shows-cfpb-staff
-donations-aimed-democratic-candidates (suggesting CFPB employees contribute more to Democrats than Republicans). However, the data from this report
is very misleading. Because of recurring low-dollar contributions, individuals
appear multiple times in the database. For example, a random sample of the
first 200 entries shows that two CFPB employees accounted for eight percent of
the entire span of contributions since the CFPB’s inception. Given the sheer volume of employees (a yearly average of roughly 1300, not including turnover),
this does not appear to be persuasive evidence of the entire Bureau’s political
lean.
131. Indeed, the CFPB’s most recent three-year state-by-state accounting of
consumer complaint volume identifies a political rainbow in the top five by volume: California, Florida, Texas, New York, and Georgia. See CFPB, COMPLAINT
SNAPSHOT: 50 STATE REPORT 2 (2018), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/
documents/6867/bcfp_50-state-report_complaint-snapshot_2018-10.pdf.
132. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE
LENDING, http://www.responsiblelending.org/consumer-fin-protection-agency
(last visited April 14, 2019) (noting initiatives directed to military members and
their families, older Americans, and equal access to credit initiatives).
133. See Crane, supra note 124, at 1852 (discussing the detached, objective,
non-partisan requirement of Humphrey’s).
134. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 624 (1935).
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2. Unique Expertise
The second principle of Humphrey’s requires that an independent agency be engaged in work in which it has unique expertise.135 For expertise to justify independence from the executive power of removal, the effectiveness of an independent
agency in its outside position must be compared to its potential
effectiveness were it situated wholly within the executive
branch.136 The unique expertise analysis assumes that the best
and brightest minds will be more likely to assist with independent agency work as opposed to executive agency work. Should
this assumption not be sound, and the expertise advantage not
actually materialize, it would weigh against finding that the
agency’s work qualifies it for treatment as an independent
agency that may constitutionally operate without its director being subject to at-will presidential removal power.137
With the brief history of the CFPB, there are not many
names to consider when addressing leadership expertise, or the
agreed upon definition of what the Supreme Court thinks “expertise” means.138 Some suggest that expertise is a function of
longevity in a narrow bureaucratic space, focused upon a particular industry or task over time.139 Thus, long-lasting presence at
an agency, coupled with low employee turnover, standing alone,
might constitute expertise. But, a narrow reading of Humphrey’s
suggests the Court originally viewed the “experts” as the commissioners themselves, who would accumulate focused bureaucratic expertise over time due to their insulation from executive
influence.140 Another view is that, with respect to specialized
135. Id.
136. Crane, supra note 124, at 1857.
137. Id. at 1856.
138. Before Richard Cordray became the first official Director of the CFPB,
the agency was initially led by Elizabeth Warren, its creator, and later Raj Date,
in the role of special advisor for the CFPB. See Daniel Bush, What Is the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Anyway?, PBS (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www
.pbs.org/newshour/economy/making-sense/what-is-the-consumer-financial
-protection-bureau-anyway.
139. See, e.g., Datla & Revesz, supra note 110, at 777 (indicating long term
employment and narrow subject areas for work correlate with “impartial expertise”).
140. See Humphrey’s, 295 U.S. at 624 (quoting, with approval, Senate testimony that “[i]t is manifestly desirable that the terms of the commissioners shall
be long enough to give them an opportunity to acquire the expertness”); see also
Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47
STAN. L. REV. 395, 434 (1995) (“The Court viewed Humphrey as an ‘expert’ . . . .”).
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agencies, expertise can be associated with avoidance of industry
capture.141 In that sense, the CFPB’s leadership is largely consistent with that goal, with few having served in leadership capacities at the CFPB’s regulated entities. Yet another formulation means that employees enter with, or are expected to acquire,
a specialized professional skill or set of industry-specific insights.142 In short, both the legal and functional meaning of bureaucratic expertise is uncertain.143 Here, focusing on two of the
aforementioned understandings of expertise—director-level expertise and staff-level expertise—suggests some divergence
from, yet consistency with, the Humphrey’s framework.
First, so far as “expertise” is intended to refer to the Director, the application of Humphrey’s is not without challenge. The
CFPB’s first Director, Richard Cordray, was previously a Marshall Scholar at the University of Oxford and editor-in-chief of
the University of Chicago Law Review.144 Specific to consumer
protection, Cordray, in his role as Ohio’s Attorney General, recovered over two billion dollars for his constituents and gained
valuable experience and expertise regarding the adjudication
and handling of consumer complaints.145 Although he has an impressive résumé,146 it is debatable whether his edge in that specific area is enough to qualify him as a unique expert on the subject matter of the CFPB. Next, Director Mulvaney had
significant expertise as well,147 though his approach to regulation and enforcement strongly differed from that of Director
141. Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 27 (2010).
142. See id. at 47–48 (discussing mandatory qualifications for certain agency
roles, such as the requirement that the PCAOB have at least two certified public
accountants or that the majority of the Surface Transportation Board have professional backgrounds in transportation).
143. For a much more comprehensive exegesis, see Michael E. Levine, Revisionism Revised? Airline Deregulation and the Public Interest, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179 (1981).
144. Press Release, The White House, President Obama Announces Richard
Cordray As Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (July 17,
2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/07/17/
president-obama-announces-richard-cordray-director-consumer-financial-pr.
145. Aaron Marshall, Wall Street Businesses Have Returned Money to Ohio,
But Richard Cordray Overstates the Total, POLITIFACT (July 26, 2010), https://
www.politifact.com/ohio/statements/2010/jul/26/richard-cordray/wall-street
-businesses-have-returned-money-ohio-ri.
146. See Press Release, The White House, supra note 144.
147. Mick Mulvaney, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/people/
mick-mulvaney (last visited April 14, 2019) (noting that Mulvaney graduated
from Georgetown University with honors, attended law school at the University
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Cordray. Perhaps he is not quite a “unique expert” either, given
that he has not previously worked in a “consumer protection” or
banking-related regulatory body or agency. And yes, the CFPB’s
most recently confirmed director, Kathleen Kraninger, was critiqued for her lack of expertise in consumer protection.148
Nonetheless, given the size of the Bureau, it is reasonable to
assume that the unique expertise cited in Humphrey’s could extend to the senior and line-staff, not merely the Director. In
short, even if the Director is a partisan appointment, “[c]areer
staff supply the agency expertise.”149 Here, it appears that the
CFPB’s senior and junior staff are uniquely expert by any conventional measure, many having served in prior academic, enforcement, supervision, rule-making, or advising roles centered
squarely in the CFPB’s regulatory space.150 So while there may
of North Carolina on a full academic scholarship, and opened his own law firm).
148. See, e.g., Emily Stewart, The Senate Just Confirmed a Director for
CFPB Who Has No Background in Consumer Issues, VOX (Dec. 6, 2018), https://
www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/12/6/18127487/kathy-kraninger-cfpb
-mick-mulvaney.
149. See Jim Wedeking, The Ozone Rule That Wasn’t: How EPA Makes Decisions, A.B.A. (Aug. 29, 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/
environment_energy_resources/publications/trends/2011_12/january_february/
ozone_rule_that_wasnt_how_epa_makes_decisions (noting that while EPA administrators have not always had scientific credentials, career staff supply the
agency expertise).
150. One methodology for assessing leadership expertise is to examine the
qualifications of a number of senior members of any given division or department. To that end, the head of CFPB’s Supervision Policy, Peggy Twohig, was
previously Director of the Office of Consumer Protection at the Department of
the Treasury. Peggy L. Twohig Biography, PRAC. L. INST., https://www.pli.edu/
Content/Faculty/Peggy_L_Twohig_/_/N-4oZ1z12d0o?ID=PE985835 (last visited
Feb. 26, 2019). The CFPB’s head of Research, Markets & Regulations, Tom
Pahl, spent fifteen years at the FTC and served briefly as the FTC’s chief Consumer Protection Officer. Stephanie Eidelman, Tom Pahl Returns to CFPB, Will
Oversee Debt Collection Rulemaking at Critical Juncture, INSIDEARM (Apr. 19,
2018), https://www.insidearm.com/news/00043907-tom-pahl-returns-cfpb-will
-oversee-debt-c. The Bureau’s head of enforcement, Kristen Donoghue, previously had roles as enforcement attorney, assistant litigation deputy in the office
of enforcement, assistant deputy director for policy and strategy in the office of
enforcement, deputy enforcement director, and finally principal deputy enforcement director. Ben Lane, CFPB Promoting Kristen Donoghue to Be New Head
of Enforcement, HOUSINGWIRE (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.housingwire.com/
articles/41768-cfpb-promoting-kristen-donoghue-to-be-new-head-of
-enforcement. The CFPB’s Fair Lending director, Patrice Ficklin, charged with
ensuring fairness in mortgage markets, among others, previously served as Associate General Counsel at Fannie Mae during the mortgage crisis. Press Release, CFPB, Treasury Department Announces Senior Leadership Hires for the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (May 11, 2011), https://www
.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/treasury-department-announces
-senior-leadership-hires-for-the-consumer-financial-protection-bureau. Finally,
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not be a clearly discernable methodology for establishing “expertise,” the CFPB’s staff should easily pass muster.151 However, in
the absence of clarity about how each of these components should
be weighed, and even if the unique expertise was not fully discernible, not all four Humphrey’s components should be required
to justify an agency’s status as constitutionally independent.
3. Wholly Executive Functions
The third component of the Humphrey’s quartet requires determining the degree to which the agency performs non-executive functions. The more prevalent such functions are, the more
likely its constitutional basis.152 Agencies that are quasi-legislative are not subject to unrestrained presidential removal power
due to separation of powers principles.153 The ability to make
laws and rules is clearly legislative; and when possessed by an
agency, this ability clearly extends its functions beyond a purely
executive scope.154 However, there is a distinction between mere
procedural rules and those that have substantive effect.155 The
CFPB has significant, substantive rule-making power.156
The quasi-legislative nature of the CFPB is found in its history of writing rules, which is functionally a legislative act.157
For example, in response to the heightened levels of payment
delinquency and foreclosure that occurred after the 2008 housing crisis, the CFPB enacted the “Ability-to-Repay” rule intended
to protect consumers from aggressive mortgage lending.158 Other
its former head of Research, Sendhil Mullainathan, received a MacArthur “Genius” award. Id. These qualifications and many others suggest a uniquely expert team dedicated to consumer financial protection.
151. Crane, supra note 124, suggests that another method would be to compare the line staff expertise to staff expertise at a similarly situated purely executive agency, which could be, in this case, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency. See id. at 1856–59. If the staff at the CFPB were not objectively “more
expert,” this would, as Crane argues, undermine the case for valuing independence. See id.
152. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 618–34 (1935); Crane,
supra note 124, at 1836–37.
153. Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 618–34.
154. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 106–08 (1926).
155. Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 618–32.
156. See Susan Dudley, Is the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Unconstitutional?, FORBES (Apr. 15, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
susandudley/2016/04/15/is-the-consumer-financial-protection-bureau
-unconstitutional/#ef38ed651b39.
157. Id.; see also Myers, 272 U.S. at 106–08.
158. Ability to Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in
Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 6407, 6407–09 (Jan. 30, 2013).
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provisions added protections for consumers against other “abusive” terms and products offered by lenders, clarified consumer
disclosure laws, and attempted to outlaw arbitration clauses in
certain consumer contracts.159 When the CFPB is acting in this
law-making capacity, it is not performing an executive duty
within the authority of the President, but accomplishing a legislative task more akin to Congress’s work. While sporadic legislative activity is not sufficient to deem the agency quasi-legislative,160 given the pervasive rule-making powers held and used by
the CFPB, it is proper to classify the CFPB as quasi-legislative.
It thus meets the third criterion of Humphrey’s four-part test for
determining whether an agency can constitutionally operate independent from unrestrained executive authority.
4. Quasi-Judicial Responsibilities
The final component of Humphrey’s mirrors the third and
asks whether the agency has quasi-judicial responsibilities.161 If
its duties encompass substantial adjudicatory functions, the office cannot be said to be purely executive in nature.162 The CFPB
is responsible for consumer complaints and often resolves those
disputes in a judicial fashion.163 By adjudicating disputes, levying penalties, and awarding relief, the CFPB is acting as a quasijudicial body. The underlying enforcement matter in PHH is obviously one such example, notwithstanding its disputed interpretation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act.164
Similar to an agency’s use of legislative powers, arguments
have been made that judicial power, if not actually used, should
not make an agency quasi-judicial.165 This argument is not applicable to the CFPB though, which has historically, even aggressively, used these powers.166 It has fined financial institutions that violated its rules, and awarded relief to aggrieved
consumer parties.167 Considering this clear and substantive adjudicatory activity, the CFPB should also be considered a quasi159. Id. at 6413, 6419.
160. See Dudley, supra note 156.
161. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 618–33 (1935); Crane,
supra note 124, at 1835–36.
162. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 106, 106–10 (1926).
163. See About Us: The Bureau, supra note 118.
164. See PHH-2, No. 15-177, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Jan. 31, 2018) (en banc).
165. See Crane, supra note 124, at 1863–68.
166. The CFPB and its Director are actively involved in the adjudication of
disputes, and do not merely possess such a power in theoretical terms.
167. About Us: The Bureau, supra note 118.
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judicial body. This designation allows the CFPB to meet the
fourth and final Humphrey’s prong for identifying a constitutionally sound independent agency.
Having considered all four elements of Humphrey’s, it appears that the CFPB very likely meets at least three of the criteria and possibly all four. The CFPB operates free from direct reliance on or influence by Congress or the executive branch.168 In
its rule-making duties, the CFPB exhibits undeniable legislative
traits and thus the agency should be considered quasi-legislative. Similarly, its adjudicatory responsibilities are judicial in
nature and should qualify the Bureau as quasi-judicial. Although the necessity of the independence of the CFPB from the
executive branch as a means of attracting and retaining the best
subject matter experts is uncertain, not clearly meeting one of
the four components should not be fatal to the agency’s justification of its constitutionally validated status, given that there is
no precedent that suggests that meeting all four components is
required. Thus, on balance, the CFPB is constitutional under the
Humphrey’s analysis.169
B. THE CFPB DIRECTOR AS A PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER
There could, in theory, be additional reasons to question the
CFPB’s constitutionality under the “Principal-Inferior Officer”
analysis engaged by Morrison170 and its progeny, including Free
Enterprise.171 However, nobody would seriously consider the Director of the CFPB to be an inferior officer and for that reason
protected from removal. To determine whether an officer was
principal or inferior, the Morrison Court offered three criteria to
168. This is less true when its current Director occupies a formal role within
the Executive Branch, as was true for a time in the Trump Administration.
169. A separate analysis focused on the Supreme Court’s “blending” dicta
would yield the same conclusion. See Justice Holmes’s opinions in Meyers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 88 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting) and Springer v.
Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 209 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting), where he
referenced “spider’s webs” and shaded penumbras to characterize the lack of
strong constitutional separation of powers provisions. Similarly, in Buckley v.
Valeo, the Court said that the Constitution does not require a “hermetic sealing
off of the three branches of government,” 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976), and noted in
Mistretta v. United States that it expects “that the coordinate Branches will converse with each other on matters of vital common interest.” 488 U.S. 361, 408
(1989). For these reasons and others, many administrative law scholars also
argue against a rigid unitary actor approach to separation of powers issues.
170. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
171. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477
(2010).
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consider. Under the Appointments Clause, an inferior officer: (1)
is subject to removal by a higher executive branch official; (2) is
empowered by the Act to perform only limited, certain duties;
and (3) holds an office that is limited in jurisdiction and limited
in tenure.172 If an agency head meets all three criteria, she is an
inferior officer. If she fails any of the three criteria, she is a principal officer.173
Analyzing the CFPB under the Morrison standard confirms
that the director is a principal officer. The director is not subject
to removal at will by any individual, and is subject only to the
President’s removal for good cause.174 Without having a superior
officer who is able to remove the director, it cannot be said that
she is subject to removal by a higher executive branch official.175
The duties that the director performs are varied and numerous.
As opposed to the limited duties of an inferior officer, the director
engages in conduct that spans all three branches. In addition,
the position’s tenure lasts beyond a single presidential cycle and
its jurisdiction regarding consumer protection is vast. Accordingly, since the director does not meet any of the three prongs, it
is evident that the CFPB is headed by a principal officer as defined by the Appointments Clause. Because of this, when considering the inferior/principal officer distinction in Morrison, the
CFPB’s Director, though a principal officer, is not constitutionally required to be removable at will by the President so long as
whatever removal power still remaining vests with the President.176 Finally, the Court made clear in Morrison that despite
the exercise of discretion by the Independent Counsel, “we
simply do not see how the President’s need to control the exercise
of that discretion is so central to the functioning of the Executive
Branch as to require as a matter of constitutional law that the
counsel be terminable at will by the President.”177 To support
that proposition, it cited the similar restrictions on removal
172. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 672–75.
173. Id.
174. Under Morrison, failing a single prong requires that the officer be
deemed principal. Id.
175. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671–72.
176. In fact, Congress has also been deferential to presidential power even
within the administrative agency regime structure. With respect to the FTC, for
example, almost forty years after the FTC’s enabling Act, Congress saw fit to
expand presidential control. The President is now allowed to name the Chairman from among sitting commissioners and the Chairman has increased powers. Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1950, 64 Stat. 1264 (1950). Similarly, Congress
gave the CFPB broad authority in its regulated space.
177. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691–92.
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power in the authorizing statute of the FTC; these exact same
restrictions exist with respect to the CFPB.178 The lack of ability
to unilaterally remove the head of the CFPB, given the alternative means of removal and other methods of executive influence,
does not significantly deprive the President of his or her ability
to take care that the law be faithfully executed.
III. ALT-HUMPHREY’S—ACTIVIST JUDGES ATTEMPT TO
OVERCOME THE HUMPHREY’S-HUMP
Because Humphrey’s, standing alone, should be sufficient
precedent to find the Bureau constitutional, it is tempting to end
the analysis here. However, a growing body of scholars, lawyers,
judges, and now Supreme Court Justices, seems to suggest that
the Supreme Court should either overrule Humphrey’s or that
the CFPB’s structure is so fundamentally different from that
contemplated in Humphrey’s that it warrants especially close
scrutiny for a host of other reasons. The D.C. Circuit’s opinions
in PHH-1 and PHH-2 and the growing body of courts using them
as precedent suggest the sort of inter-circuit conflict that will
merit Supreme Court review. And, while PHH-2 provides ample
persuasive reasoning that the CFPB sits on firm constitutional
ground pursuant to Humphrey’s and other factors, it is useful to
reflect more broadly on the flawed PHH-1 arguments lest they
continue to persuade or influence courts moving forward. To engage this argument and explore its fallacies, one must also focus
on its many assumptions and unusual persuasive techniques.
In PHH-1, the panel refused to adhere to the historical precedent set in Humphrey’s and instead quasi-embraced the reasoning—or perhaps the quiet aspirational spirit—of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Free Enterprise.179 In doing so, the PHH-1
court determined that the structure of the CFPB is unconstitutional because it is an extremely powerful independent agency
headed by a single individual outside of the President’s direct
178. There are plenty who view Morrison as no longer favored by the Court.
And, within a unified executive framework, it is true that the Court’s view regarding the unique above-the-law nature of the Independent Counsel would deserve to be fully re-examined if the Independent Counsel statute still existed.
See Lee S. Liberman, Morrison v. Olson: A Formalistic Perspective on Why the
Court Was Wrong, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 313, 314–17 (1989). It may be inconsistent
to find, on the one hand, that the President has the power to control the Executive Branch with wide discretion (including over termination) but not revisit
whether the President has the power to terminate, say, the Director of the
CFPB.
179. See PHH-1, No. 15-1177, slip op. at 9–10 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 11, 2016).
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chain-of-command and that its current structure “threatens individual liberty.”180 It is no surprise that the decision in PHH-1,
while still vaguely referencing the standards developed in most
of the aforementioned cases, focused intensely on invoking unusual arguments about how the CFPB’s design features threaten
liberty and violate historic commission membership norms rather than performing a more case-centric analysis.181
A. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE CFPB AND THE FTC
But first, a reminder. The Myers and Humphrey’s frameworks for determining the constitutionality of a removal provision of an independent agency head have been the guiding precedent for eighty-three years. As such, independent agencies may
be consistently upheld as constitutional under Humphrey’s.182
Similar to the CFPB, the FTC has been generally considered an
agency with multiple functions that slice across all three
branches of the federal government. It serves as a quasi-legislative body with regard to rulemaking. It serves as a quasi-judicial
body through its administrative judges and hearings. It serves
as a quasi-executive body through civil enforcement mechanisms
in the courts. Like the CFPB’s enabling statute, the FTC Act extensively discussed Congress’s goal of ensuring that the Commission would remain independent and nonpartisan.183 The Senate Committee report explained that the Commission was being
created, in part, to replace an existing executive branch office.
The advantage of replacing that office, the Committee noted, was
that the FTC could then be free from partisanship and exercise
its independence from the President.184 The Committee report’s
appendix quotes the bill’s chief sponsor’s description of the proposed Commission as “independent of executive authority, except in its selection, and independent in character.”185 The House
Committee report similarly emphasized the FTC’s independence
when it noted “the bill removes entirely from the control of the
President and the Secretary of Commerce the investigations conducted and the information acquired by the commission.”186
180. Id. at 59.
181. See id. at 9–10.
182. All challenges to independent agencies using Myers and Humphrey’s
analysis failed until Free Enterprise.
183. See S. REP. NO. 63-597, at 11 (1914).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 22.
186. H.R. REP. NO. 63-533, at 3 (1914).
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When the Supreme Court revisited the legislative history, it
came to the correct conclusion that the floor debates in favor of
independence “were long and thorough and contain nothing to
the contrary.”187 Because the FTC is so similar to the CFPB and
because the legislative histories and purposes uniquely align, for
the D.C. Circuit in PHH-1 to determine that the CFPB was unconstitutional, it was forced to look elsewhere for precedent by
suggesting that the CFPB’s singular director structure rendered
it completely inapplicable to Humphrey’s on that basis alone.188
And when applying Free Enterprise, the PHH-1 court took a narrow holding of a factually distinct case189 and applied dicta liberally to circumvent preparing a thorough Humphrey’s analysis—one which would have clearly forced it to acknowledge that
the CFPB, like all but one challenged agency before it, was a
valid independent agency able to constitutionally operate outside the direct control of the President.
Much of the PHH-1 Court’s analysis focused on the CFPB’s
perceived lack of accountability. But the CFPB may in fact be
the most accountable executive agency—independent or otherwise—in two key areas: transparency within the branches and
accountability to its mission stakeholders (regulators and regulated entities).190
B. MEASURES ENSURING THE CFPB’S ACCOUNTABILITY
With respect to inter-branch accountability, there are numerous liberty-enhancing safeguards. The director must testify
before Congress, twice a year, in both Houses.191 The CFPB must
issue annual reports to congressional committees and the President, which require it to justify its expenses,192 its rulemaking,193 and its enforcement and supervisory functions,194 and
then discuss the prior year’s consumer complaints,195 financial
187. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 625 (1935).
188. See PHH-1, No. 15-1177, slip op. at 9 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 11, 2016) (vacated).
189. See id. at 34, 41–44.
190. Advocates for the CFPB have recognized the importance of these protections and provided substantial insight for this analysis. See Accountability of
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CONSUMER FED’N AM., https://
consumerfed.org/pdfs/CFPB-Accountability-fact-sheet-6-11.pdf (last visited
April 14, 2019).
191. 12 U.S.C. § 5496(a) (2012).
192. Id. § 5496(c)(2).
193. Id. § 5496(c)(3).
194. Id. § 5496(c)(5).
195. Id. § 5493(b)(3)(C).
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literacy,196 and its monitoring efforts.197 The CFPB is subject to
audit by the Comptroller General and the Government Accountability Office, and the Comptroller separately submits its audit
to Congress and the President.198 The Bureau’s enforcement actions can be challenged in federal court,199 its rules are subject
to the standard Administrative Procedure Act process,200 and it
must submit quarterly spending reports to the Office of Management and Budget.201 Congress can overturn the CFPB’s rules
with legislation under the Congressional Review Act, and it has
repeatedly done so.202 Should time grant it 20/20 hindsight, the
CFPB can also later repeal its own quasi-legislative acts.203 Further, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) can stay
or set aside any rules that interfere with the “safety and soundness” of the banking system.204 Pending an FSOC vote, the Secretary of the Treasury is empowered, upon the request of any
FSOC member, to stay the effective date of any Bureau rule.205
With respect to accountability to stakeholders, there is a
large number of statutory protections. The CFPB must consult
with a dizzying array of federal regulators prior to proposing
rules;206 incorporate regulators’ objections into the rulemaking

196. Id. § 5493(d)(4)(A)–(B).
197. Id. § 5512(c)(3)(A).
198. Id. § 5497(a)(5)(A)–(B).
199. Id. § 5563(b)(4).
200. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59 (2012).
201. 12 U.S.C. § 5497(a)(4)(A).
202. See, e.g., H.J. Res. 111, 115th Cong. (2017) (rejecting the CFPB’s arbitration rule); see also Press Release, CFPB, CFPB to Hold Auto Lenders Accountable for Illegal Discriminatory Markup (Mar. 21, 2013), https://www
.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection
-bureau-to-hold-auto-lenders-accountable-for-illegal-discriminatory-markup
(discussing its former guidance about fair lending and indirect auto lenders and
noting the repeal of such guidance by Congress in May 2018).
203. See William Hoffman, CFPB to Reconsider or Repeal Auto Title Lending
Rule, AUTO FIN. NEWS (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.autofinancenews.net/cfpb
-to-reconsider-or-repeal-auto-title-lending-rule.
204. 12 U.S.C. § 5513(a).
205. Id. § 5513(c)(1)(A).
206. Id. § 5512(b)(2)(B) (“[T]he Bureau shall consult with the appropriate
prudential regulators or other Federal agencies prior to proposing a rule and
during the comment process regarding consistency with prudential, market, or
systemic objectives administered by such agencies . . . .”); id. § 5531(e) (“In prescribing rules under this section, the Bureau shall consult with the Federal
banking agencies, or other Federal agencies, as appropriate, concerning the consistency of the proposed rule with prudential, market, or systemic objectives
administered by such agencies.”).
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record;207 share examination data208 and complaints;209 conduct
a cost benefit analysis for proposed rules;210 include the impact
of such rules on small banks, credit unions, and rural consumers;211 and contemplate the consequences of “unduly burdensome
regulations.”212 It also must notify the Attorney General when
commencing enforcement actions.213 It must consult with federal
and state regulators to minimize the regulatory burden for large
institutions.214 It must give small businesses previews of new
proposals prior to the general public as well.215 It must reassess
its rules, with required public comment, within five years of implementation.216 Finally, it must submit its budget requests—a
budget that is statutorily capped217—to the Federal Reserve
even though it is funded separately from congressional appropriations.218 The dizzying array of both inter-branch and public-facing accountability measures are real. As such, they render the
CFPB’s critics’ hyperbole—such as the “director is in fact answerable to no one[,] . . . not subject to any meaningful executivebranch oversight [and] . . . insulated from . . . any real legislative
oversight”219—downright comical, even alt-factual.
C. PHH-1’S FLAWED RELIANCE ON HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF
AGENCY STRUCTURE
The PHH-1 court reasoned that, although the Supreme
Court had never held that agencies headed by a single person
could not be independent, historical evidence showed that inde-

207. Id. § 5512(b)(2)(C).
208. Id. § 5512(c)(6)(C)(i).
209. Id. § 5493(b)(3)(A).
210. Id. § 5512(b)(2)(A)(i).
211. Id. § 5512(b)(2)(A)(ii).
212. Id. § 5511(b)(3).
213. Id. § 5564(d)(1).
214. Id. § 5515(b)(2).
215. Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 1100G, 124 Stat. 1955, 2112; Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, S. 942, 104th Cong. § 404 (1996).
216. 12 U.S.C. § 5512(d)(1)–(3).
217. Id. § 5497(a)(2)(A)(iii).
218. Id. § 5497(a)(1).
219. Brief of the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of DefendantsAppellants at 4, CFPB v. All Am. Check Cashing, Inc., No. 18-60302 (5th Cir.
July 9, 2018). That the CATO Institute can say “[t]he director is, uniquely in
our government, accountable to literally no one” with a straight face demonstrates the weakness of its—and others’—positions. See id. at 12.
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pendent agencies are almost exclusively headed by multi-member committees and that such historical precedent was relevant.220 This “unitary director” structure, according to PHH-1, is
not only extremely uncommon, but also more susceptible to corruption and arbitrary decision-making than a multi-member
committee, and represents an amount of unilateral power offensive to separation of powers principles.221 Referencing that historical precedent vaguely and repeatedly, the court decided that
the novelty of the structure of the CFPB—it being the only independent agency wielding significant executive power while led
by a single individual—weighed against it when considering its
constitutionality.222 The court’s suggestion that Supreme Court
dicta hinted that novelty might be a relevant factor was not
new,223 but was also untethered from a robust analysis of the
facts as applied to relevant law, most notably Humphrey’s.
As the PHH-1 court saw it, there has never before been an
independent agency headed by a single individual who possesses
powers as significant as those vested in the CFPB. Further, its
director is protected from removal by the President by a justcause provision, and without a multi-member committee, it is
also allegedly free from any other legitimate check or balance—
threatening liberty as we know it.224 Whereas historically independent agencies have been led by multi-member committees
made up of colleagues who provided each other’s checks and balances, the Director of the CFPB is able to uniformly determine
“what rules to issue; how to enforce, when to enforce, and against
whom to enforce the law.”225 But the PHH-1 court’s rhetoric is
particularly amusing given the many above-mentioned statutory
provisions restricting the CFPB’s ability to issue rules, the timing of rules, and the various categories of entities that are not
subject to its reach.
The PHH-1 court also addressed the select few independent
agencies that exist with an individual serving as the agency

220. PHH-1, No. 15-1177, slip op. at 36–38 (D.C. Cir. Oct 11, 2016) (vacated)
(citing examples of invocations of history, but largely ignoring the Court’s
agency cases).
221. Id. at 43–44.
222. Id. at 43
223. See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance:
The Modern Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2109, 2139
(2015).
224. PHH-1, slip op. at 23–26.
225. Id. at 7.
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head, and reasoned that because all similar agencies were created or reorganized recently, they suffer from the same constitutional problems that the CFPB does—solely because they too
lack established historical precedent.226 All of these independent
offices or agencies—the recently revised Social Security Administration, the Office of Special Counsel, and the Federal Housing
Finance Agency—were created after 1978, with the FHFA created in 2008.227 In addition to the recent creation of these agencies, the law enforcement and penalty assessing powers of the
CFPB are absent from the Social Security Administration and
the Office of Special Counsel.228 Thus, although there are rare
examples of independent agencies headed by individuals, they
are contemporary creations and they are fundamentally less
powerful than the CFPB.229
The PHH-1 court also used an unwieldy and ahistorical combination of analysis from Free Enterprise to reason that novel
agency structures are inherently constitutionally problematic
due to a lack of precedent, and that when the constitutional text
does not provide sufficient clarity, a long-standing established
practice “is a consideration of great weight.”230 The structure of
the CFPB deviated from the settled historical practice of having
multi-member committees lead independent agencies.231 Because of its fundamental differences from the typical structure
of an independent agency, coupled with its potential for arbitrary decisions that could threaten individual liberty, the court
refused to extend the Humphrey’s precedent to the CFPB.232 But
the PHH-1 court’s warped view of unchecked power threatening
liberty assumed away the many checks and balances and accountability mechanisms built into the CFPB. The PHH-1 court
226. Id. at 29–35. That said, many banking and financial regulatory frameworks, while not “independent” from the executive in the Constitutional sense,
do have single directors or more unitary hierarchies, such as the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, National
Credit Union Association, and the Federal Reserve’s Division of Supervision
and Regulation. And, many of these singular financial-regulator offices have
existed longer than most independent agencies. Thus, one might conclude from
these long-standing regulatory arrangements that, at least with respect to the
financial sector, having a singular-regulator is more common than it might be
for other regulated industries.
227. Id. at 29. The Independent Counsel statute was not renewed. Id. at 31.
228. Id. at 32 n.5.
229. Id. at 34.
230. See id. at 39–40.
231. Id. at 43.
232. Id. at 9–10.
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may have invoked the specter of a liberty-squashing regulatory
boogeyman, but the truth is, in fact, the opposite.
D. PHH-1’S MISTAKES: IMPROPER APPLICATION OF FREE
ENTERPRISE, AND OVEREMPHASIS ON “HISTORY” AND “LIBERTY”
Ultimately, the PHH-1 court continued to pay lip service to
Free Enterprise at the remedy stage, and concluded that although the structure of the CFPB is unconstitutional in its current format, the proper remedy was merely to strike the justcause provision, making the Director of the CFPB removable at
will by the President and turning the CFPB into a traditional
executive agency.233 In doing so, it refused to foist any substantive change upon the CFPB’s operations or scope. The court recognized it had an alternative option, that is, instead of removing
the just-cause provision and turning the CFPB into a traditional
executive agency, it could have changed the single-director structure into a multi-member committee, turning the CFPB into a
constitutionally acceptable independent agency.234 However, the
court reasoned that such a change would involve more potential
issues and create additional problems for the agency in the short
term, and left such a decision up to Congress.235 In addition, the
court cited recent precedent demonstrating that severing the
problematic provision is the most common remedy for this type
of constitutional ill.236
With the PHH-1 opinion judicially dead (but still living as
theory), an entirely new—but tenuous—critical framework has
emerged. Rather than grounding their reasoning in Myers,
Humphrey’s, and their progeny, courts and scholars instead
choose to embrace more recent decisions and tether their rhetoric to a suspicion of the constitutional infirmity of novel structures, specifically the CFPB’s deviation from the tradition of
multi-member committees heading independent agencies.237 In
short, dicta and a cursory glance at Free Enterprise allow these
233. Id. at 69.
234. Id. at 68–69. The PHH-1 court, recognizing the application of Humphrey’s could not be completely ignored, seemed willing to suggest that a CFPB
with five directors would be virtually identical in structure to the FTC, rendering it Constitutional. Id. Further, because the PHH-1 court equated design “novelty” with suspect Constitutional footing, the change to a more historically-familiar design would remove one of that court’s key criteria for finding the CFPB
unconstitutional.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 66–67.
237. See, e.g., id. at 8–9.
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critics to reason that new and atypical agency structures are inherently constitutionally problematic.238 But Humphrey’s cannot
be that easily ignored.
The PHH-1 court cited Free Enterprise in order to avoid
Humphrey’s, but failed to appreciate that the court in Free Enterprise undertook an extensive Humphrey’s analysis—even beginning its opinion by restating its agreement with Humphrey’s
and noting “[we] held that Congress can, under certain circumstances, create independent agencies run by principal officers
appointed by the President, whom the President may not remove
at will but only for good cause.”239 The Free Enterprise Court determined that under that analysis, the PCAOB removal structure prevented the President from faithfully executing the
law.240 It did not simply state that because the two degrees of
separation structure was new, it was unconstitutional, but rather it applied an Article II analysis, focusing on the “inferior
officer” distinction, and only then determined that the removal
provisions were unconstitutional.241 In addition, the Court in
Free Enterprise did not hinge its decision on whether the agency
was led by an individual or a multi-member committee. The only
issue after having determined that the nature of the agency met
the four criteria of Humphrey’s was whether the removal structure prevented the President from meeting his Article II responsibilities.242
Finally, the holding in Free Enterprise would seem to be inapplicable to the CFPB because the agency removal structure
and corresponding relationships involving the CFPB are funda-

238. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477,
505–06 (2010) (suggesting that a lack of historical precedent is a constitutional
problem is a dangerous game). The road from Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896) to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), as with the journey
from Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) to Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996) to Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), should remind us that
referencing the norms of the past as a Constitutional status-quo baseline is not
always the wisest approach to preserving individual liberty or upholding the
Constitution. As Justice Scalia’s dissent in Romer reminds us, the Bowers court
held that the Constitution did not ensure the right to “what virtually all States
had [prohibited] from the founding of the Republic.” Romer, 517 U.S. at 640
(Scalia, J., dissenting). The Taney court similarly referenced the “histories of
the times” as a basis for denying Dred Scott his Constitutional rights. See Dred
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1856).
239. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 483.
240. Id. at 484.
241. See id.
242. Id. at 496.

2468

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[103:2429

mentally different from those of the PCAOB. Whereas the structure of the PCAOB prevented the President from having substantive input in the good-faith determination of cause, the
CFPB’s structure and framework does no such thing. In Free Enterprise, the President had no legitimate way to influence the decision-making process and would have had his ability to perform
his constitutional duties severely impacted by the SEC usurping
his power.243 Conversely, the President determines whether
there is just-cause to remove the Director of the CFPB. Because
the President has direct input regarding the just-cause determination, he is able to effectively enforce the laws. To make the
CFPB’s situation analogous to the PCAOB’s, the remaining removal power in a CFPB challenge would have to vest in the Federal Reserve as only this would mirror the SEC’s control over the
PCAOB. Although Free Enterprise has been a good development
for Myers enthusiasts because it offers courts a potential Maginot Line for resisting congressional overreach and will likely continue to be invoked in future challenges to removal, the appropriateness of its application to the now-resolved PHH case and
to future cases involving other dissimilar agencies seems tenuous. Not all new or atypical structures are inherently unconstitutional. The novelty issue is most salient when the structure stops
the President from being able to faithfully execute his Article II
powers.244 Whereas the design of the PCAOB’s removal process
was convoluted and likely to burden the President, the single
layer of good-cause restriction for the CFPB’s director also comports with the other post-Humphrey’s independent agencies that
have had their constitutionality upheld.245
The holding of Free Enterprise was narrow because it maintained conformity with Humphrey’s and Myers—which is why
the factual differences between the CFPB and the PCAOB are so
critical. Whereas the President had no direct control over
PCAOB board members, the President determines whether
there is just cause to remove the Director of the CFPB. This ability to determine if cause exists has been consistently upheld under Humphrey’s as sufficient for the President to meet his Article
II responsibilities. The inability to meet these responsibilities
under the two-degrees of separation structure was the ultimate

243. Id.; Bader, supra note 95, at 277.
244. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 484.
245. The CFPB operates with a single layer of just-cause removal separation
from the President. The PCAOB in Free Enterprise had two layers of separation.
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reason that the PCAOB was deemed unconstitutional, not because the agency’s structure was novel.246 To apply Free Enterprise differently is to distort its holding and its purpose. Had this
been an issue of first impression with no set precedent to follow,
the PHH-1 court’s reasoning might be sufficient. But with such
a well-established framework already in place, it was the court’s
role to thoroughly apply the law that the Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed. That analysis must flow through Humphrey’s.
Finally, the rhetorical flourish of the PHH-1 court (and the
PHH-2 minority) is particularly concerning given its unwillingness to engage precedent—and even other members of the court.
The PHH-1 court invoked “history” seventy-eight times in its
more than one hundred pages. It cited Free Enterprise fortyeight times, more than it cited Humphrey’s, the foundational
case in this line of jurisprudence. Similarly, the court invoked
“liberty” fifty-three times—more than it cited or referenced Myers, Bowsher, Youngstown Steel, Buckley, and Mistretta combined.247 The opinion’s references to “history” and “liberty” combined eclipse its reference to all relevant case law, including Free
Enterprise and Humphrey’s.248 Put differently, the court’s unusually heavy reliance on historical analysis and abstract liberty
principles obfuscated what it did not do: it did not directly engage the Supreme Court’s 100 years of executive agency jurisprudence. This was the recipe for a flawed analysis.
The PHH-1 court simply gave too much persuasive impact
to the theoretical value of a unitary executive. As a lower court
accurately noted, “[t]he President is not required to execute the
laws; he is required to take care they be executed faithfully.”249
Perhaps Humphrey’s was not nearly as wide-ranging as some
commentators suggest, which allowed the PHH-1 court to
ground its analysis in a limited way. At the core of Humphrey’s,
the Court held that the FTC acts in part quasi-legislatively and
in part quasi-judicially, but that it “exercises no part of the executive power vested by the Constitution in the President.”250
Based upon that demarcation of authority and responsibility, the
246. See id.
247. The court invoked “liberty” fifty-three times, compared to Myers (18),
Bowsher (8), Youngstown (7), Buckley (4), and Mistretta (2). See PHH-1, No. 151177, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Oct. 11, 2016) (vacated).
248. PHH-1 makes 131 references to history or liberty as compared to 128
references to relevant case law. See id.
249. SEC v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 855 F.2d 677, 682 (10th Cir. 1988).
250. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935).

2470

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[103:2429

Court found that the FTC’s executive functions at the time were
largely incidental to the other core functions and that in any case
the Commission did not exercise executive power “in the constitutional sense”.251 The regulatory and political environment, and
the FTC’s core functionality have changed since Humphrey’s.
Perhaps the findings that the core functionality of the FTC was
definitely non-executive was at least part of the basis for the
Court’s decision in Humphrey’s, although it has never held that
to be significant in its agency jurisprudence to date. But, until
the Supreme Court says otherwise, the CFPB should be seen as
independent from undue branch influence, nonpartisan,
uniquely expert, and possessing quasi-judicial and legislative
duties. Thus, it satisfies the criteria to constitutionally avoid the
reach of unrestrained at-will presidential removal power.252
E. WHY PHH-1 STILL MATTERS
Although PHH-1 was reversed en banc, its primary author,
Justice Kavanaugh, was not persuaded by the full court’s analysis. The PHH-1 majority’s refusal to critically engage other
points of view or the entirety of what became the PHH-2 majority’s analysis suggests a deep intractability to the legal divide—
almost to the point of absurdity.253 The PHH-2 court correctly
rejected the PHH-1 framework, restoring Humphrey’s to its
rightful place in this jurisprudence. That said, other courts continue to consider these claims with varying levels of analysis,
with some still relying on the now-withdrawn opinion from PHH1.254 Continued reference to PHH-1 is misguided; rhetorical appeals to liberty and history are not sufficient to overcome the
Supreme Court precedent that overwhelmingly favors the
CFPB.255
251. Id.
252. See Crane, supra note 124.
253. The dissent in PHH-2 so intently refuses to engage its critics or the
court’s majority that large parts of its analysis, in fact, most of it, is simply
wholesale cut and pasted from PHH-1 word-for-word as if PHH-2’s majority
opinion doesn’t even exist. This suggests that its author is not only unpersuaded
but does not see the need to pretend that the other arguments are even worth
considering.
254. See supra note 19; see also CFPB v. RD Legal Funding, No. 17-CV-890
(LAP) (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2018) (presently on appeal); CFPB v. D&D Mktg., No.
2:15-CV-09692, 2016 WL 8849698, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2016), interlocutory
appeal granted, No. 17-55709, 2017 WL 597428 (9th Cir. May 17, 2017) (including an initial finding that the CFPB is unconstitutional).
255. This is especially so when that history is not nearly as persuasively onesided as the PHH-1 court suggested. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 611–12 (1789)
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F. NEXT STEPS—MOVING TO A FIVE-MEMBER COMMISSION
Much of PHH-1 centers around Justice Kavanaugh’s belief
that the novelty of the director-structure is almost prima facie
evidence of the CFPB’s unconstitutionality.256 As explained
above, these arguments are simply inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s independent agency jurisprudence. Thus, while
Justice Kavanaugh and ideological opponents of the CFPB may
have been wrong on the constitutional issues, they were right on
one point: the singular director structure is deficient.
The singular director structure is deficient not because it is
unconstitutional, but because it is undesirable, and its political
costs outweigh its perceived administrative benefits. A singular
director is more susceptible to insular decision-making, partisan
influence, and abuse than a multi-member commission with a
staggered membership and bipartisan appointment structure. In
2011, congressional Republicans proposed a sensible multimember replacement, articulating various reasons for its greater
likelihood of success: first, a commission with staggered terms
provides greater leadership stability over time; and second, a
commission structure promotes greater consistency in rule-making and administration.257 Congressional Republicans presciently argued that:
[A] single director will set up a situation in which the leadership of the
CFPB will be subject to the variances in ideology from one administration to another when the director is appointed. Consumers stand to lose
the most if we have a situation in which the directorship of the CFPB
swings back and forth between the extremes of the political spectrum.258

But now that the political pendulum has swung toward the Republican party and a Republican-appointed CFPB director sits
in the chair, is it terribly surprising that its initial detractors
(statement of James Madison) (noting that “there may be strong reasons why
an officer [such as the Comptroller of the United States] should not hold his
office at the pleasure of the Executive branch” if one of his “principal
dut[ies] . . . partakes strongly of the judicial character”); see also Free Enter.
Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 514–49 (2010)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
256. See PHH-1, No. 15-1177, slip op. at 29, (D.D.C. Apr. 12, 2016) (vacated)
(“Prior to oral argument, in an effort to be comprehensive, the Court issued an
order asking the CFPB for all historical or current examples it could find of
independent agencies headed by a single person removable only for cause.”); see
also id. at 64 (“[W]e therefore conclude that the CFPB is unconstitutionally
structured because it is an independent agency headed by a single Director.”).
257. See 157 CONG. REC. 11,698 (2011) (statement of Rep. Capito).
258. Id.
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now think the single-director structure is solidly constitutional?259
As we have seen in recent years, a singular director model
can become effectively partisan. Visions that a singular director
structure would yield more rapid and efficient lawmaking did
not come to pass.260 And so, with a political turn-about and a
singular director, it is to be expected that a partisan appointment by a new President could bring about “a chilled CFPB law
enforcement program [that] will lead to a disempowered, less affluent America.”261 In fact, enforcement actions steeply dropped
during Director Mulvaney’s tenure; it remains too soon to determine whether his successor shares his enforcement approach.262
But in this political climate, there may be a bipartisan opportunity to shift the singular director model to a multi-member
model similar to other federal agencies. As the PHH-1 court
noted, such a change is well within congressional power.263 If
Congress were to replace the singular director position with a
multi-member commission, the removal structure would no
longer be atypical, and the agency could once again be recognized
as independent—even by its critics. Such a distinction would allow the multi-member commission to operate more effectively
generally, consistent with lessons also gleaned from business

259. See, e.g., Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee CFPB at 24, 40, CFPB v. All Am.
Check Cashing, Inc., No. 3:16-CV-356-WHB-JCG (5th Cir. Sept. 10, 2018) (arguing that its singular director structure is firmly constitutional).
260. See, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. 6237 (2010) (statement of Sen. Whitehouse)
(“We need a regulator in place who can monitor the market and act quickly
when there is a consumer hazard.”); 156 CONG. REC. 12,436 (2010) (statement
of Rep. Meeks) (“Led by an independent director, this office will be able to act
swiftly so consumers will not need to wait . . . to receive protection from unscrupulous behavior.”).
261. Christopher L. Peterson, The Risk of an Anti-Consumer CFPB, DEMOCRACY (Dec. 21, 2017), https://democracyjournal.org/arguments/the-risk-of-an
-anti-consumer-cfpb.
262. There were fifty-six enforcement actions in 2015; forty-two in 2016;
thirty-two in 2017; and just six through September 30, 2018. See Jeff Bater,
Enforcement Actions Drop Sharply at Trump-Led CFPB, BLOOMBERG BNA (Oct.
11, 2018), https://www.bna.com/enforcement-actions-drop-n73014483278.
263. PHH-1, No. 15-1177, slip op. at 69 (D.D.C. April 12, 2016) (vacated)
(“[I]f Congress prefers to restructure the CFPB as a multi-member independent
agency rather than as a single-Director executive agency, Congress may enact
new legislation that creates a Bureau headed by multiple members instead of a
single Director.”).

2019]

CONSTITUTIONALIZING PROTECTION

2473

and social-science literature about better and more effective governance structures.264 It would mitigate capture concerns, such
as they exist, from both sides of the aisle.265 And, it would prevent the long-term reign of a director opposed to the CFPB’s mission as interpreted by its advocates.266 Finally, of course, such a
change fundamentally undercuts the logic in PHH-1, among
other cases.267 Yes, ultimately the Supreme Court could also constitutionally blue-pencil the removal clause to save the CFPB,
but severing it would of course make the CFPB a completely political agency, something it was structured to entirely avoid.
CONCLUSION
The stakes are high. Some of the CFPB’s most important
actions are rooted in its executive independence and can fairly
be seen as implementing a broad economic and racial equality
framework for consumers, regardless of who holds our nation’s
highest office.268 To the extent that the Bureau becomes merely
an arm of the executive and subject to its whims, its nonpartisan
focus and racial-equity impact will be substantially imperiled.269
264. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking
in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 12–19 (2002) (reviewing evidence). But see Daniel E. Ho, Measuring Agency Preferences: Experts, Voting,
and the Power of Chairs, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 333 (2010) (finding, among other
things, that even multi-member commissions can prove to be highly dysfunctional and that the leadership of such (e.g. the Chair) holds the most influence
and power).
265. See generally Barkow, supra note 141, at 17–18.
266. See, e.g., CFPB, BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2018-2022, at 2 (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.consumerfinance
.gov/documents/6208/cfpb_strategic-plan_fy2018-fy2022.pdf (purporting that
Director Mulvaney will fulfill statutory obligations but “will go no further”).
267. Though as the PHH-2 court noted, “Congress’s choice—whether an
agency should be led by an individual or a group—is not constitutionally
scripted and has not played any role in the [Supreme] Court’s removal-power
doctrine.” PHH-2, No. 15-1177, at 43 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 31, 2018) (en banc).
268. See, e.g., Press Release, CFPB, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
and Department of Justice Action Requires BancorpSouth to Pay $10.6 Million
to Address Discriminatory Mortgage Lending Practices (June 29, 2016), https://
www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection
-bureau-and-department-justice-action-requires-bancorpsouth-pay-106-million
-address-discriminatory-mortgage-lending-practices (describing CFPB’s Consent Order with BancorpSouth regarding mortgage lending discrimination
claims); Toyota Motor Credit Corporation Settlement, CFPB (Feb. 2, 2016),
https://www.tmccsettlement.com (describing CFPB’s Consent Order with
Toyota Motor Credit regarding discrimination claims alleged by motor-vehicle
purchasers).
269. See, e.g., Eric Levitz, The Trump Administration Just Made Life Easier
for Racist Lenders, N.Y. MAG. INTELLIGENCER (Feb. 1, 2018), http://nymag
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That said, the constitutional death of the CFPB and other
independent government agencies is greatly exaggerated, like
Mark Twain’s first death.270 The Supreme Court has affirmed
the constitutionality of independent agencies regularly since
Humphrey’s. In the rare instances that it has not, only the offending provision has been removed, while the remaining structure stayed valid. Though PHH-1 created a stir by avoiding precedent and invoking rhetoric of history and novelty, the PHH-2
court correctly identified the key issues and found the Bureau’s
structure sound.271 When applying each piece of the constitutional analysis under Humphrey’s and its progeny, the CFPB
qualifies as the type of agency that is constitutionally able to
function independently without unfettered presidential oversight. It is nonpartisan, uniquely expert, quasi-judicial, and
quasi-legislative—removing it from the exclusive domain of the
executive. The CFPB conforms to established requirements: it
does not vest ultimate removal power in itself; it does not vest
removal power in a third party other than the President; it is not
protected from presidential oversight by more than one layer; it
also does not burden the President’s ability to perform his or her
constitutional duties to enforce the law. And, even in these partisan times, the executive still acknowledges that its law enforcement power does not extend over independent agencies.272
.com/intelligencer/2018/02/the-white-house-just-made-life-easier-for-racist
-lenders.html (describing Director Mulvaney’s announcement in February 2018
that he would transfer the Office of Fair Lending and Equal Opportunity from
the Supervision, Enforcement, and Fair Lending Division to the Director’s Office, where it will become part of the Office of Equal Opportunity and Fairness
and focus solely on advocacy, coordination, and education, but not enforcement
actions); see also Kate Berry & Rachel Witkowski, Senate Dems to Mulvaney:
How Did Embattled Aide Get CFPB Job?, AM. BANKER (Oct. 3, 2018), https://
www.americanbanker.com/news/senate-dems-to-mulvaney-how-did-embattled
-aide-get-cfpb-job. Since Director Mulvaney took office on November 27, 2017
and December 1, 2018, the CFPB filed zero fair lending enforcement actions.
270. See supra note 1 and accompanying text; see also Free Enter. Fund v.
Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010); PHH-1, No. 15-1177,
slip op. (D.C. Cir. Oct. 11, 2016) (vacated). These cases endorse the principle of
allowing an offensive provision to be excised from the remaining good law. This
effectively ensures that substantive agency actions and purposes will remain
enforceable.
271. The PHH-2 court’s analysis is consistent with a longitudinal historical
review. See Strauss, supra note 98, at 597 (noting the “text and structure of the
Constitution impose few limits on Congress’s ability to structure administrative
government”).
272. For example, President Trump issued an Executive Order which proposed sweeping new rules for executive agency rulemaking, most notably that:
“(a) Unless prohibited by law, whenever an executive department or agency
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Vague threats against liberty are not enough to ignore a
hundred years of agency solitude. When asked to invalidate a
statutory provision “that has been approved by both Houses of
the Congress and signed by the President, particularly an Act of
Congress that confronts a deeply vexing national problem, [the
Supreme Court] should only do so for the most compelling constitutional reasons.”273 None are found here.
If the Supreme Court were to find otherwise and permit
even greater concentrations of presidential power over independent agencies, the President would certainly conform them to his
political will as soon as possible after taking office. Such an unexpected result would certainly surprise the original sponsors of
the FTC Act, as well as those who created the CFPB. Just as was
true with the FTC, the Supreme Court has long since settled the
idea that “Congress did not wish to have hang over the Commission the Damocles’ sword of removal by the President for no reason other than that he preferred to have on that Commission
men of his own choosing.”274 To protect the CFPB’s legacy, and
by extension, other independent agencies, scholars and judges

(agency) publicly proposes for notice and comment or otherwise promulgates a
new regulation, it shall identify at least two existing regulations to be repealed.”
Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339, 9339 (Jan. 30, 2017). The Office of
Management and Budget’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)
is responsible for interpretation of the Executive Order. The accompanying clarification from the Trump administration’s OIRA contains a Q&A, as follows:
Q: Do Section 2’s requirements apply to significant regulatory actions
of independent agencies? A: No, the requirements of Section 2 apply
only to those agencies required to submit significant regulatory actions
to OIRA for review under EO 12866. Nevertheless, we encourage independent regulatory agencies to identify existing regulations that, if repealed or revised, would achieve cost savings that would fully offset the
costs of new significant regulatory actions.
Memorandum from Dominic J. Mancini, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Interim
Guidance Implementing Section 2 of the Executive Order of January 30, 2017,
Titled “Reducting Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs” (Feb. 2, 2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/briefing-room/
presidential-actions/related-omb-material/eo_iterim_guidance_reducing_
regulations_controlling_regulatory_costs.pdf; see also Stephanie Eidelman, Interim Guidance Says 2-for-1 Regulation Rule Doesn’t Apply to CFPB, INSIDEARM (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.insidearm.com/news/00042622-interim
-guidance-says-2-1-regulation-rule (discussing EO 13,771’s applicability to the
CFPB).
273. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring);
see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (deeming sentencing
guidelines constitutional because Congress did not delegate legislative power to
the agency, nor did they offend the separation of powers doctrine).
274. Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958).
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should reexamine their understanding of the consequences of reifying a unitary-executive framework, and also square their critiques of the CFPB more thoroughly within the last century’s
larger body of Supreme Court independent agency jurisprudence.
Should any of the current CFPB cases reach the Supreme
Court, as I expect one will, the Court should reaffirm its traditional Humphrey’s-centric agency analysis and determine that
the CFPB is structurally constitutional, while rejecting the novelty-as-unconstitutional approach. While the foundational cases
will surely receive attention from the Court, the appeal may
nonetheless turn on its evolving interpretation of Free Enterprise
and its applicability to the CFPB. The CFPB’s structural similarity to the agencies present in prior Supreme Court decisions
that upheld removal restrictions will likely outweigh the tenuous application of Free Enterprise to the CFPB as occurred in
PHH-1. In its consideration of the CFPB’s constitutionality, the
Supreme Court will have the opportunity to further define (1)
the contours of the President’s removal power, (2) its process for
identifying constitutionally permissible independent agency design structures, and (3) the proper role of Humphrey’s and its
progeny. Through its grounded principles and application of
precedent, the Court should find that the foundation of the
CFPB, whether a five-person or one-person structure, is settled
on firm constitutional ground.

